CEO INSIDE DEBT AND THE MATURITY STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE DEBT

Fang Sun ； Chun-Wei Xian ； Ying-Hong Zhang

《Advances in Quantitative Analysis of Finance and Accounting》 13期 (2015/12) Pp. 225-251

https://doi.org/10.6293/AQAFA.2015.13.09

並列摘要

We study whether CEO ownership of debt in the form of deferred compensation and pension benefits affects corporate debt maturity structure. Controlling for previously identified determinants of debt maturity, we find a significant and robust inverse relation between CEO inside debt and corporate debt maturity. Our findings provide support for the argument that inside debts align the incentives of top executives with outside debtholders. These findings have important implications for academics and practitioners in their understanding of the role played in financial decisions by CEO inside debt.

並列關鍵字

Inside Debt ； Pension Benefits ； the Maturity Structure

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