論休謨的人格同一性理論

在人格同一性的爭論中，儘管對於人格同一性判準有著分歧的主張，但多數理論都同意，人能夠覺知到某種終生不變且不間斷的「自我」。不過，休謨反對此一觀點。在《人性論》卷一中，休謨主張根本沒有所謂的人格同一性，人只不過是一束知覺，而人格同一性的觀念僅是出自想像力的虛構。本文的目的即在探討休謨的人格同一性理論。首先，我將檢視休謨對其主張所提出的證成。其次，我將分析幾種對休謨人格同一性理論的批評。第三，針對休謨在《人性論》〈附錄〉中所提出的自我批判，我將探究兩種可能的詮釋，以理解休謨為何不滿意自己對人格同一性提出的說明。最後，我將指出，休謨的理論無法解決意識統合的問題。

關鍵字

人格同一性；印象；自我；休謨；意識

並列摘要

Although there is considerable disagreement on the criterion of personal identity, most theories of personal identity agree to the view that we can be aware of something invariable and uninterrupted throughout a whole life, which we call our 'self'. But David Hume rejects this view. In Book Ⅰ of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume argues that there is no such thing as personal identity, and we are nothing but a bundle of perceptions. According to Hume, the idea of personal identity is a fiction of the imagination. This paper attempts to examine Hume's theory of personal identity. Ⅰ will begin by examining how Hume justifies his claims. Next, Ⅰ will critically analyze some criticisms of Hume's claims. Third, regarding Hume's self-criticism in the Appendix to his Treatise, Ⅰ will investigate two possible interpretations to understanding why Hume dissatisfies with his account of personal identity. In conclusion, Ⅰ will argue that Hume's theory cannot solve the problem of the unity of consciousness.