交叉授權與社會福利

Cross Licensing and Social Welfare

顏以理(Yi-Li Yan)

指導教授 ： 梁文榮

淡江大學/商學院/產業經濟學系碩士班/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2011.00798

摘要

本文假設二家廠商均生產一個同質產品，各自擁有一個對方需要的創新技術，且在市場上從事 Cournot 數量競爭，探討廠商的均衡授權策略組合、最適授權策略以及社會福利之比較。本文得到下列結論：(1) 二廠商有一個優勢策略組合，即雙方均採授權策略，因此二廠商會從事交叉授權。(2) 若廠商選擇交叉授權且對固定權利金不限制不得為負值，則會透過單位權利金來調整市場總產量至生產聯合獨占產量。但若限制固定權利金不得為負值，則當製程創新程度夠小時，廠商無法生產聯合獨占產量。(3) 二授權廠商的最適授權策略為混合授權，且當製程創新程度夠小時，二授權廠商的最適單位權利金會超過製程創新程度。但若限制固定權利金不得為負值，當製程創新程度夠小時，授權策略為等於製程創新程度的單位權利金授權。(4) 若不限制固定權利金不得為負值，當製程創新程度夠大時，交叉授權下的社會福利比授權前的高；反之，當製程創新程度夠小時，交叉授權後的社會福利比授權前的低。但若限制固定權利金不得為負值，則交叉授權後的社會福利一定會提高。此結論提供政府採取反托拉斯法，限制固定權利金不得為負值的理論基礎。在上述本文的四個結論中，尤以第二個結論最為重要。

關鍵字

交叉授權 ； 單位權利金授權 ； 混合授權 ； 獨占產量

並列摘要

This paper develops a duopoly model, in which both firms have a process innovation, respectively, that can reduce the rival’s marginal production cost and engage in Cournot competition in the commodity market, to explore the equilibrium licensing contract combination and the impact of licensing contract to the social welfare. We show that (1) the dominant strategy combination is that both firms will definitely choose licensing strategy, i.e., cross-licensing is the equilibrium licensing contract combination. (2) If both firms choose cross-licensing and there is no restriction that the fixed-fee must be non-negative, firms will charge a royalty rate so as to produce the monopoly output. However, if the fixed-fee is required be non-negative, both firms are unable to produce the monopoly output as the innovation size is small. (3) The optimal licensing contract is mixed licensing. Moreover, the optimal royalty rate would be greater than (be equal to) the innovation size, if the innovation size is small with no restriction (with restriction) on the non-negative value of fixed fee. (4) If the fixed-fee is required be non-negative, social welfare would improve by choosing cross-licensing as the innovation size is large while worsen, otherwise. However, social welfare would definitely improve by choosing cross-licensing if the fixed-fee is required be non-negative. This provides the rational for the government to enact an anti-trust law for confining to a non-negative value of fixed fee. It is worth noting that the second conclusion mentioned above is the most crucial in this thesis.

並列關鍵字

Cross Licensing ； Royalty Licensing ； Mix Licensing ； Monopoly Output

參考文獻

Eswaran, M., 1994, “Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating Device,” Canadian Journal of Economics 27, 689-708.

Fershtman, C., and Kamien, M., 1992, “Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10, 329-348.

Liao, C. H., and D. Sen, 2005, “Subsidy in Licensing: Optimality and Welfare Implications,” The Manchester School 73, 281-299.

Kamien, M., and Y. Tauman, 1986, “Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 471-491.

Kamien, M., S. S. Oren, and Y. Tauman, 1992, “Optimal Licensing of Cost-reducing Innovation,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 21, 483-508.