法庭前的密室-緩起訴裁量因素之分析

The Dark Room before Court： Factors that Affect Prosecutorial Discretion in Deferred Prosecution

蘇慰潭(Wei-Tan Shu)

指導教授 ： 林育聖

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/犯罪學研究所/碩士(2012年)

摘要

德國刑法學者F. Von Liszt 曾謂：「刑法裁量權是法官在黑暗中摸索的偶然與隨心所欲的決定」。是言法官心證晦暗難明，裁量因素難以窺知。而在進入法庭之前，依我國刑事訴訟法設計，賦予檢察官對有充分犯罪嫌疑之案件，得予以起訴裁量之空間。此一裁量空間，既乏有效監督，裁量因素亦難窺知，是謂密室。而檢察官於此法庭前之密室所為緩起訴與否的裁量，是否也是在黑暗中摸索與偶然的決定呢？

蓋檢察官緩起訴裁量因素所涉場域錯綜複雜，可能影響因素莫衷一是，然追本溯源，裁量背後根基者仍為檢察官之自由意志（free-will）。是不同於相關研究均由法制度面切入檢討，著重於比較法學、訴訟法理及刑事政策意義等法制闡述及學理研究，指向法規範面之應然（normative），本研究欲以實證面（positive）切入，以經濟學之理性選擇模型（models of rational decision）為分析工具，併以心理學認知結構（cognitive structure）作為方法，合一論證，解釋裁量緩起訴處分與否，均係檢察官理性選擇（rational choice）之結果，而為檢察官主觀效用利益最高、最好之結果（optimal outcomes）。此係人類行為之本質，於涉法律場域如此，於法律外（extra-legal）場域亦復如是，無有差異。復透過深度訪談之質性研究方法，解釋在主觀期望利益模式（subjective expected utility model）底下，緩起訴裁量決定，均為成本效益分析（cost-benefit analysis）之結果。影響檢察官裁量因素一切場域，莫非如是。

關鍵字

緩起訴 ； 理性選擇

並列摘要

The German criminal law scholar, F. Von Liszt, said, “The judicial discretion in sentencing is actually made by the judge who justify the facts randomly and accordingly from darkness”. This statement pointed out the ambiguous nature of criminal law that the discretion may not be so justice, nor can the conditions of the judgment be clear. According to the design of the criminal law in Taiwan, prosecutors have the right to prosecute a suspect if there is sufficient supporting evidence for the criminal conduct. Such empowered right for prosecutor do not have effective supervision, nor can the conditions of the prosecution be known by public; in which the whole process could be considered as a “secret chamber”. Further, would the discretion of the prosecutor postponing any prosecutions be the same as the judges making their decision in darkness?

The factors that affect the prosecutors’ discretion in are complex; therefore, no consensus on definitive factors is has been drawn yet. However, it is clear to say that the judgments are still based on the prosecutors’ free will, which deviates from research in the same area. Most of the studies in this area discuss this issue from the perspectives of the science of law, the theories of prosecution, or the policies of criminal laws. The present study, however, discusses the issue from positive perspective. This research employed the Models of Rational Decision from economics as an analysis tool and the Cognitive Structure from psychology, to explain the decision of postponing prosecution is as a result of prosecutor s’ rational choice. In other words, the decision is made from optimal outcomes subjectively considered by the prosecutors. This phenomenon is not unusual for to human behaviors included the legal and extra-legal situations.

The qualitative methods were employed to explain prosecutors’ decision making process with the Subjective Expected Utility Model: every decision in postponing a prosecution is an outcome generated on the cost benefit analysis. This outcome would be apply to every situation which affects prosecutors’ decision making.

並列關鍵字

deferred prosecution ； rational choice

參考文獻

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