股東直接訴權之研究：以契約、侵權與法定救濟為中心

A Study of Shareholders' Direct Actions-Centered on the Contract, Tort, and Statutory Remedies

張庭維(Ting-Wei Chang)

指導教授 ： 曾宛如

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2015.02442

摘要

股東直接訴權係相對於股東代位訴權而言，其本質上最大難題在於，如何從公司整體利益區別出股東個人利益之範圍。本文將股東個人利益界分為「契約利益」、「純粹經濟利益」與「法定特殊權利」，這三種股東個人之利益分別受到契約直接訴權、侵權直接訴權與法定直接訴權之保護。
契約直接訴權較不具法理爭議性，然若欠缺明示、書面契約，默示契約是否存在於股東與公司間或股東相互間，將成爭執所在，此時法院有必要探求、解釋存在於該等人之間的「合理期待」；另一方面，股東協議作為公司經營最常見之文件，也能夠成股東直接訴權重要環節，不過我國法院實務對於股東協議之效力過於保守。
侵權直接訴權係保護股東之純粹經濟利益，法理上極具爭議，本文以民法第184條第1項為基礎，研究認為善良風俗構成要件，解釋上可能涵蓋股東平等原則，然而過度抽象，法院操作上不易一致，法律效果以金錢賠償為主，亦不適合於團體紛爭之處理，亦即欲從純粹經濟利益觀點來辨識股東之個人利益，將有治絲益棼之可能。
法定直接訴權則以公司法為主，本文研究發現現行法制對於股東法定直接訴權欠缺體系統合，立法論上值得參考英國公正衡平解散救濟制度與不公平侵害救濟制度，以股東平等原則作為團體紛爭處理之核心原則，於我國公司法增訂公司法第11條之1、第11條之2與第11條之3，將不作為請求與股份收買命令納入股東直接訴訟救濟之方法中，跳脫股東訴訟限於金錢賠償之窠臼。

關鍵字

股東直接訴權 ； Foss原則 ； 不公平侵害 ； 反射損害 ； 合理期待 ； 禁制令 ； 股份收買

並列摘要

The shareholders’ direct actions are the opposite of the shareholders’ derivative actions in theory, but the most tough problem is how to distinct and separate the shareholder’ personal interests from the company’s interest. The thesis divides shareholder’ personal interests into “interests vested by contract,” “pure economic interests,” and “legal rights”. Those three kinds of private interests are protected by contract, tort and statutory remedies, respectively.
The contractual direct actions are most indisputable; however, without an express or a written contract, a dispute might occur whether there is an implied contract between the shareholder and the company, or between the shareholders. To solve this problem, it’s necessary for the courts to search and explain their legitimate expectations. On the other hand, because the shareholders’ agreements are common in corporate management, they are also an important source in shareholders’ direct actions. Nevertheless, our courts tend to be very conservative, denying the legal effect of shareholders’ agreements frequently.
The shareholders’ pure economic interests are protected by tort. This thesis puts emphasis on the Civil Code s184 (1). The element of “the injury is done intentionally in a manner against the rules of morals” could be explained to include the shareholders’ fairness principle. Notwithstanding, due to the vagueness in s184 (1), it’s not easy for the courts to operate the concept of “the rules of morals” consistently. Moreover, the legal effect of s184 (1) is to compensate the victim’s injury, but monetary remedies, which may intensify the conflicts between members, are not suitable in group law. As a result, it’s not always proper to identify shareholders’ personal interests from the perspective of pure economic interests.
The statutory remedies are centered on the Company Act. Due to the lack of integration in our Company Act, our law cannot provide shareholders effective remedies to avoid the unfair prejudice. This thesis suggests that our Company Act should be amended. With reference to the just and equitable winding-out and the unfair prejudicial remedies in UK law, we could amend our Company Act by adding s11-1, s11-2, and s11-3. Only in this way, injunctions and share purchase order can be the general remedy in shareholders’ direct actions, not limited to the monetary compensation.

並列關鍵字

shareholders’ direct actions ； Foss rule ； unfair prejudice ； reflective loss ； legitimate expectations ； injunction ； appraisal right

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