本文由公司本質出發,以公司股權結構對公司治理制度影響之角度,探討異議股東收買請求權制度對監控內部人不法行為及促進經濟效率之功能。 異議股東收買請求權制度之理論基礎為何,影響法規範應於何時賦予異議股東收買求權、如何核定公平之收買價格等。但令人困擾的是,學者間對於該制度之功能與目的眾說紛紜,擬予以整理歸納,俾供吾人在解釋相關規範時,得作出合乎法律目的之解釋。 美國實務上異議股東收買請求權的案例,有集中母子公司現金逐出合併的現象,許多母公司更利用現金逐出合併方式,與上市的子公司合併,並進行「下市(going private)」,為避免公司大股東在公司需要資金時,即將公司上市櫃取得便宜資金,當其發現公司股票市價低於公司真實價值時,即進行現金逐出併購,以高於市價但低於公司價值之價格,將其他股東逐出,而獨享公司股份市價與真實價值間之價差,藉由公司上市及下市間之來回操作進行只對自己有利的操作,異議股東收買請求權將是可以倚重之防弊措施。 然而,我國股份收買請求權制度之運作卻未能發揮其應有功能,歸納其原因主要在兩方面,其一:程序之設計過於繁瑣,且過於偏袒公司,造成小股東行使成本過大,降低其行使的動機。其二:公平價格之核定過渡倚賴股份之市價,使小股東未能取得持股之實際價值。因此如何便利小股東行使,並確保小股東取得持股實際價值,應為我國股份收買請求權制度修正的重心。本文除檢討我國股份收買請求權之規範及法院見解之妥適性外,並介紹美國法律、法院判決與學界著作等相關立法及論述,供我借鏡。
This paper is founded on the concepts of efficiency as well as corporate microeconomic theories and finds that the minority shareholders’ appraisal right could play a important role on the corporate governance. The appraisal right could facilitate value-increasing transactions and discourage value-decreasing ones, and help shareholders uncover and prevent truly wrongful behavior by the corporate insiders( including the controlling shareholders) . Fiduciary suits could compensate wronged shareholders and deter managerial or majority shareholder misbehavior. But such litigation could be expensive, with procedural and substantive hurdles to overcome. Appraisal could serve this discovery goal effectively because it is relatively quick (especially because there is no need to prove the presence of a wrongdoer), because it generally calls for a sharing of costs between the parties, and because it could bring out information about corporate assets and plans that is useful to anyone considering a fiduciary suit. However, the appraisal right has received very little attention in Taiwan. There are two major reasons for this. One, a lot of the procedural obstacles for a shareholder exists in Taiwan, including that the procedures of exercising the appraisal right are too complicate and the expenses associated with the appraisal right are too high for a minority shareholder. The other, the courts in Taiwan will not award the dissenting shareholder the fair value of this shares, because they defer to market price when fixing fair value. The purpose of this paper is to propose a comprehensive reform for the Taiwanense appraisal statute.