威權主義與國家財政能力－以中國大陸財政改革為例之分析

Authoritarianism and State Fiscal Capacity: The Case of China

林宗弘(Thung-Hong Lin)

《政治學報》 47期 (2009/06) Pp. 105-154

https://doi.org/10.6229/CPSR.2009.47.04

摘要

本文從掠奪性國家的財政模型出發，分析威權主義下國家財政能力的變遷。威權體制與民主體制相比之下，統治者的資源壟斷與議價能力高，因此更傾向財政集權；但其租稅的交易成本，尤其是監督納稅人的交易成本與委託代理成本也偏高，因此，在租稅收益收歸中央、收稅成本與財政支出向下級或地方政府攤派時，其下級單位或地方代理人更容易掠奪納稅人，其財政支出則偏愛增加行政官僚本身的利益，結果，威權體制容易導致行政官僚開支的膨脹與財政支出在貧富之間的逆向分配。本文以中國大陸1994年分稅制改革為例，以1978～2004年間29省分省數據的固定效果模型確認了財政集權的負面後果。筆者發現在威權主義財政收入集權的趨勢下，地方政府承擔財政支出與負債，引發行政官僚人事與管理費用擴張，排擠教育、衛生與社會保險等公共支出，並加重對農民的剝削，造成貧富差距與區域差距的惡化，呈現了威權主義對國家財政收支管理效率與租稅公平的不利影響。

關鍵字

中國研究 ； 財政分權 ； 租稅 ； 國家能力 ； 區域不平等

並列摘要

How does authoritarianism shape the tax regime as a fundamental dimension of state capacity? Following the predatory state theory, I claim that the authoritarian ruler appreciates stronger monopoly of political resources and bargaining power for maximizing the tax revenue, but also be frustrated by higher monitoring and agency costs. When the authoritarian ruler raises and centralizes the tax revenue, it usually leads to the apportionment of expenditure and the expanding predatory behaviors of the local agency. Also, the fiscal expenditure is in favor of the administrative spending and some infrastructure rather than education, health-care and social welfare. Therefore, it leads to the rent-seeking of cadres and the inversed redistribution between the rich and the poor.The case study of Chinese sharing tax reform in 1994 demonstrates the effects of fiscal centralization under authoritarianism. After 1994, the central government extracted greater share of tax revenue as well as apportioned the expenditures, and the local government reduced the public services as well as strengthened the exploitation to the peasants. The statistical evidences from the provincial panel data between 1978 and 2004 confirmed that the fiscal reform increased the local administrative expenditure and deteriorated the regional inequality in China. Summing up, the authoritarian fiscal centralization can hardly enhance the state capacity; instead, it suffers from the principal-agent problem, which constrained the effectiveness of both the administrative capacity and the redistributive policies.

並列關鍵字

China study ； fiscal decentralization ； regional inequality ； state capacity ； taxation

參考文獻

林宗弘、韓佳(2008)。政治貪腐的制度理論：以亞洲各國爲例的分析。台灣政治學刊。12(1)，1-28。

林宗弘(2007)。民主與威權的制度績效：亞洲四小龍政治經濟發展的量化分析。台灣政治學刊。11(1)，3-67。

陶儀芬()。

〈中共上海市委書記陳良宇被革職〉，2006，BBC中文網：http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_5370000/newsid_5376900/5376972.stm。2008/9/25

〈內地雪災損失超過沙士〉，2008，《香港文匯報》，2008/2/24，香港文匯報網站：http://paper.wenweipo.com/2008/02/24/YO0802240010.htm。2008/9/25