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  • 學位論文

利益驅動的博弈過程—深圳城中村改造

The redevelopment of “urban villages” in Shenzhen, China: A benefit-motivated gambling process

指導教授 : 王鴻楷
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摘要


在中國經濟崛起的趨勢下,境內各城市(尤其是沿海城市)皆產生經濟蓬勃發展導致的快速擴張現象,其中包括與中國特有的土地所有權二元化體制直接相關的獨特「城中村」現象。此中國獨有的城中村和其他發展中國家貧民窟現象在本質與構成的因素上有不盡相同之處,本研究試圖深入了解城中村的形成、特色、問題與發展歷程,並對兩者做出比較分析。 本文以中國在八零年代第一批進行經濟改革開放政策且擁有特殊政治經濟地位的深圳經濟特區為研究城市。深圳擔當引領中國經濟發展的重要角色,在歷經二十餘年的城市經濟發展後,正面臨城市發展轉型與經濟產業升級的關鍵階段,使城中村改造成為深圳市政府下一步不得不認真解決的城市發展問題。 本研究透過兩個實際城中村改造案例的過程與結果,對兩案間不同的改造模式作比較分析,同時討論地方政府以城市發展角度下對城中村進行改造的動機,兩者雖因在不同改造模式下產生相異的介入角色,但均可透過城中村改造過程觀察出在土地利益驅動下所引發多方角力的博弈關係,而主導推動此城中村改造政策的地方政府則是最大獲利的贏家。 中國的城中村現象與其他發展中國家的貧民窟皆導因於城市經濟迅速發展吸引大量農村剩餘勞動力前來,而政府卻無力解決龐大低收入階層廉租住宅問題所形成的違法營建現象,兩者雖皆面臨消防安全、環境品質與治安等問題,但城中村卻又另有原村民間的血緣關係、土地合法使用權之持有、房東與房客組成的人口結構與村內特有之正式管理組織等異於一般發展中國家貧民窟的特點。 本文最後將研究的議題關注在深圳城中村改造對未來城市發展與社會所產生的衝擊與影響,就如同深圳帶動中國經濟發展的過程一樣,在率先面臨與進行解決城中村改造問題的同時,深圳正備受中國其他經濟快速發展城市的關注,期望藉由深圳城中村改造經驗,作為城市未來發展的借鏡。

關鍵字

深圳 城市化 城中村 貧民窟 住宅問題

並列摘要


Under the rapid economic growth in China, its cities, especially those in coastal areas, are faced with a wide variety of problems, including the need to redevelop the so-called “urban villages”, a unique phenomenon directly related to China’s distinctive dual land ownership systems. These “urban villages” are caused by factors not similar to those underlying squatter settlements in other developing countries. We try to understand the causes, peculiarities and the process of development of these settlements in China and make comparative analysis between these two categories. The target city of our study is Shenzhen in Guangdong province. To play a leading role in China’s economic reform and development, Shenzhen is among the first group of Special Economic Zones established in 1980. After more than two decades of break-neck growth, the City is in a critical stage of urbanization and industrial adjustment. This situation forces the city government to consider serious solutions to the problem of redevelopment of “urban villages”. By probing into processes and consequences of the redevelopment, we carry out a comparative analysis of two “urban village” cases, focusing on how local governments (from the perspective of urban development) and other participants play their roles in a variety of ways. The emerging commonalities among the two include: 1. profits from real estate development are the shared purpose that propelled the whole gamble-like process; and 2. the local governments, master minding the relevant policy-making, are the biggest beneficiary. Both China’s “urban villages” and the squatter settlements in other developing nations arise from the influxes of surplus agricultural labor lured to cities where economies are growing but governments are unable to provide sufficient affordable housing for huge numbers of low-income families, and both are troubled with problems of fire control, living conditions and public security. However, “urban villages” are distinguished from their counterparts by the villagers’ tightly-knitted family relations, legitimate land-use rights, the demographic composition characterized by dominance of landlord/tenant elements, and the existence of state-authorized administrative establishments. Finally we turn our attention to the impacts of the redevelopment in urban and social terms. Like its role as a forerunner in China’s economic reform and development, Shenzhen is now under eager observation of other fast-growing cities hoping to learn from its experiences in solving the problem of “urban villages”.

參考文獻


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Smith, N. (1996). The New Urban Frontier:Gentrification and the Revanchist City, New York: Routledge.
參考文獻

被引用紀錄


黃瓊慧(2011)。寄居穴:深圳外來勞動者住房供給體制分析〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2011.02295
翁慶鐘(2010)。快速都市化下村集體地的開發類型—珠三角城中村/村中城案例〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.00606

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