公司出售或控制權出售時之股東利益最大化原則─論德拉瓦州法院Revlon/QVC Doctrine之適用範圍

The Doctrine to Maximize Shareholders' Interests when Corporate Put for Sale or Sale of Control-Study on the Applicable Scope of the Delaware Supreme Court Revlon/QVC Doctrine

林國彬(Kuo-Bin Lin)

《臺北大學法學論叢》 87期 (2013/09) Pp. 119-176

摘要

公司董事會對公司及全體股東負有受任人義務，然而不同持股目的之股東彼此間以及股東與公司間，即可能因其持股目的之不同而產生對利益認定之不同，或對不同股東群體間產生不同的利益程度影響，而公司董事會在處理相關事宜時係必須以全體股東或公司為利益思考之方向，但在公司處理企業併購交易事宜時，此種衝突性將更為明顯，例如以經營為目的之股東與以財務投資為目的之股東對於併購交易即可能有不同之立場，此時董事會究竟應以何種標準進行公司或全體股東之利益判斷，即有可爭議之處。我國企業併購法第5條第1項規定公司董事會處理併購交易時應以全體股東之最大利益行為，然而何謂最大利益亦非無疑問，以何種認定標準判斷最大利益之內容，而利害關係人之利益在公司社會責任理論之下係被鼓勵應予考慮的，惟在此一條文中則未受到規範，是否立法有意排除或限縮無法從立法資料中獲得線索。本文擬以美國德拉瓦州最高法院自1985年Revlon判決起所立下之Revlon Duty開始討論，在何種情形下公司董事會於處理併購交易事宜時應改變其身份而扮演類似拍賣官之角色，以最高價格出售公司並使全體股東獲得短期利益之極大化，及在後續的Paramount Communication, Inc v. Time, Inc.與Paramount Communication Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.所確立的公司出售或控制權出售時之最大利益原則即Revlon/QVC Doctrine，以作為我國企業併購法第5條第1項解釋之參考。

關鍵字

公司出售 ； 控制權出售 ； 企業併購 ； 受任人義務 ； 股東利益最大化 ； 股東利益衝突 ； 其他利害關係人 ； 公司社會責任

並列摘要

The board of directors owes the fiduciary duties to the corporation and its whole shareholders. However, different shareholders have different purposes for their shareholding, therefore, it is usual for interests conflict among and between different shareholders and among shareholders and the corporate. Different shareholders will have different standards to consider what is the best interest for him. According to the Company Code and theories, the board of directors shall consider the corporate as a whole and all of its shareholders to make the decision to fulfill their fiduciary duties. Thus, how to interpret Section 5 subsection 1 of the Mergers and Acquisitions Act, which requires the board to consider the maximum interests of the shareholders when the board is making the decision regarding a M&A transaction, is a critical issue for the board. The author in this article will try to introduce the Delaware Supreme Court 1985 case, the Revlon case and the Revlon Duty, to discuss the duty to maximize the shareholders' interests and under what kind of conditions the board will change their role into an auctioneer to get the highest price for its shareholders in the transaction. The author will further discuss the Revlon/QVC Doctrine which was established in following cases, Paramount Communication, Inc v. Time, Inc. and Paramount Communication Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. In this Doctrine, when the corporate is put for sale or constitute a sale of control, the Revlon Duty will be triggered, and the Delaware Supreme Court explain what is a ”corporate for sale” or ”sale of control”. The author thus will make a short comment on the Section 5 subsection 1 of the Mergers and Acquisitions Act.

並列關鍵字

Corporate for sale ； sale of control ； mergers and acquisitions ； fiduciary duties ； maximize shareholders' interests ； shareholders' interests conflict ； other constituency ； corporate social responsibility ； Revlon Duty ； Revlon/QVC Doctrine

參考文獻

王文宇(2003)。新公司法與企業法。元照出版有限公司=Angle Publishing Co. Ltd=yuan zhao chu ban you xian gong si。

劉連煜(1995)。公司監控與公司社會責任。五南圖書出版股份有限公司=Wu-Nan Bookstore=wu nan tu shu gu fen you xian gong si。

劉連煜(2009)。現代公司法。自版=self publication。

賴英照(2009)。股市遊戲規則─最新證券交易法解析。自版=self publication。

林國彬(2009)。敵意併購防禦措施之研究─以財務性防禦措施中之毒藥丸為主要範圍。臺北大學法學論叢。71