運氣平等主義的制度進路合適嗎？論非選擇運氣的再確認

Is the Institutional Approach to Luck Egalitarianism Appropriate? On Redetermination of Non-selective Luck

林耕漢(Keng-Han Lin)

《東吳哲學學報》 37期 (2018/02) Pp. 1-27

摘要

本文旨在探討運氣平等主義應如何克服運氣範圍過大的難題。運氣平等主義是一種分配正義理論。其主張，當不平等是出於個人的選擇時，那不平等是可接受的；反之，當不平等是非選擇運氣的結果時，那這樣的不平等是不可接受的。並且，我們應該透過資源的分配來補償出於運氣的不平等。然而，運氣平等主義必須說明哪些運氣是應該補償的，而哪些不是。否則只要運氣是非選擇的，同時造成不平等的結果，那依據運氣平等主義的標準似乎都應該加以補償。倘若如此，這會導致運氣範圍過大的問題。本文即試圖探討運氣平等主義應如何克服這項問題。

關鍵字

運氣平等主義 ； 制度進路 ； 運氣 ； 分配正義 ； 正義理論

並列摘要

This paper aims to explore how should luck egalitarianism overcome the problem that the range of luck is too large. Luck egalitarianism is a theory of distributive justice. It claims that inequality is acceptable, when it is the result of personal choice; on the contrary, inequality is unacceptable, when it is the result of non-selective luck. And, we should compensate this inequality by allocation of resources. However, luck egalitarianism must explain what kind of luck should be compensated, and what should not be. Otherwise, it seems that all lucks should be compensated, as long as they are non-selective and result in an unequal outcomes. If so, this will lead to the problem that the range of luck is too large.

並列關鍵字

Luck Egalitarianism ； The Institutional Approach ； Luck ； Distributive Justice ； Theories of Justice

參考文獻

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