《孟子》反映的倫理學型態－從德性倫理學的觀點看

對孟子倫理學義理的詮釋，康德式的詮釋進路是迄今主流。而本文的主旨在於，以德性倫理學的角度闡發孟子倫理學思想同樣是有相當價值的選擇。由於篇幅所限，本文將集中以孟子性善論的核心論述為研究焦點，以說明孟子的倫理學思想以人內在的道德禀賦、道德品質為善，人的價值、道德判斷的基礎在於人能否自覺與生俱來的善端並擴充存養而成仁義禮智之德，道德本心的體與用亦須藉這擴充存養的發展過程以得充分的理解和說明。本文將援引德性倫理學家斯樂德(Michael Slote)和赫詩侯絲(Rosalind Hursthouse)的理論資源，論證孟子的義理亦能從「德性倫理學」的倫理學型態予以詮釋，此種詮釋不必與康德式詮釋進路相衝突，反倒對我們更全面掌握孟子的睿識提供了極為重要的補充。

關鍵字

孟子；四端之心；道德禀賦；德性；道德法則；德性倫理學；律則倫理學

並列摘要

Regarding Mengzi's ethical doctrines, the Kantian interpretation has been so far the mainstream approach. The theme of this paper is point out that to explicate Mengzi's ethical thought from the perspective of virtue ethics is also a quite valuable option. Due to the limits of space, this article focuses on the central discourse of Mengzi's doctrine of good human nature in order to explain how the inner moral capacity and moral quality are considered the goodness of human nature in Mengzi's ethical thought. The judgment of one's value and morality is based on whether he or she can be aware of the natural born sprouts of goodness and thus develop/cultivate them into the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. Also, it takes this very process of development/cultivation to fully understand and explain the immanence and application of the original moral mind. Here we will invoke Michael Slote's and Rosalind Hursthouse's theories to argue that Mengzi's doctrines can also be interpreted through virtue ethics. This approach does not necessarily conflict with the Kantian approach; on the contrary, it is an extremely important complement if we want to grasp Mengzi's wisdom completely.