還原的深度與自然之謎－梅洛－龐蒂的現象學方法及其藝術意蘊

The Depth of Reduction and the Mystery of Nature - Merleau-Pont's Phenomenological Method and Its Artistic Implication

王亞娟(Yajuan WANG)

《哲學與文化》 47卷2期 (2020/02) Pp. 155-169

摘要

梅洛－龐蒂在繼承胡塞爾的現象學時，並不認同完全還原對事實存在的排除。因而，當胡塞爾的現象學懸置藝術主題時，梅洛－龐蒂則把現象學方法應用於藝術物件。還原的應用使梅洛－龐蒂認識到藝術創作只能在意識活動中獲得明證的起源，但塞尚的懷疑則說明從意識出發來闡明藝術創作的不充分性。這事實上是以繪畫藝術為思考範例，表明受意識原則協調的創作與不可還原的存在之間的悖論。這一思考使梅洛-龐蒂修改了胡塞爾的還原方法，得出完全還原的不可能性學說，並將現象學引向對自然存在的深度追問。對梅洛－龐蒂而言，深度是向著前理想存在對還原的推進，它揭示了各種存在在根本上的交互侵越。因而，深度還原更新了胡塞爾的現象學，並為藝術創作探問和表達自然提供了借鑑。

關鍵字

完全還原 ； 藝術創作 ； 身體 ； 自然 ； 深度

並列摘要

Merleau-Ponty does not agree with the complete reduction which excludes the existence of facts when he inherits Husserl's phenomenology. Although Husserl suspends the artistic themes, Merleau-Ponty applies phenomenological method to artistic objects. The application of reduction makes Merleau-Ponty realize that artistic creations can only obtain their evident origin in the act of consciousness, but the doubts of Cézanne indicate the insufficiency of the explication of the artistic creations starting from consciousness. The painting art is actually employed as an example of the thought, which shows the paradox between the creation subordinated to the principle of consciousness and the irreducibility of existence. It is this thought that enables Merleau-Ponty to modify Husserl's method of reduction by drawing the doctrine of the impossibility of complete reduction, which leads phenomenology to the deep questioning of natural existence. For Merleau-Ponty, depth is the advancement to the pre-ideal existence of reduction, which reveals the radical encroachment of the beings. Therefore, the reduction to depth updates Husserl's phenomenology and provides references for the art creations which inquiring and expressing the nature.

並列關鍵字

Complete Reduction ； Art Creations ； Body ； Nature ； Depth

參考文獻

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