直覺主義邏輯與反事實條件句

Intuitionistic Logic and Counterfactuals

羅伊．T. 庫克(Roy T. COOK) ； 李晽(Mao LI) ； 劉葉濤(Yetao LIU)

《哲學與文化》 47卷8期 (2020/08) Pp. 93-115

摘要

威廉姆森（Timothy Williamson）在《哲學的哲學》（The Philosophy of Philosophy）中就如何理解反事實條件句提出了一種反事實認識論，在這種理論的基礎上提出了一種經典邏輯樣式的模態理論，即經典模態邏輯T。基於對威廉姆森理論的扼要闡釋，從反事實認識論的直覺主義視角可以得出模態邏輯T的直覺主義版本；同時也可以參照威廉姆森為經典邏輯所做的溯因辯護，對直覺主義邏輯提供一種威廉姆森式的溯因辯護，從而回應威廉姆森針對直覺主義邏輯提出的反對意見。

關鍵字

威廉姆森 ； 反事實條件句 ； 經典邏輯 ； 直覺主義邏輯 ； 溯因論證

並列摘要

In The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues for how to understand counterfactual conditionals, epistemology of counterfactuals, and on the basis of which a modal theory in the style of classical logic is given, that is classical modal logic T. Based on a brief rehearse of Williamson's theory, a corresponding intuitionistic version of T can be derived from the perspective of the epistemology of counterfactuals. In the meantime, an abductive defense in a Williamson-style for intuitionistic logic can be given by analogy with the same kind of defense for classical logic, so that Williamson's objection to intuitionistic logic can be responded.

並列關鍵字

Williamson ； Counterfactuals ； Classical Logic ； Intuitionistic Logic ； Abductive Argument

參考文獻

Armour-Garb, B. Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Bell, J. A Primer of Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Burgess, J. “Which Modal Logic is the Right One?,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40.1(1999): 81-93.

Halldén, S. “A Pragmatic Approach to Model Theory,” Acta Philosophica Fennica 16(1963): 53-63.

Cook, R. & J. Cogburn. “What Negation is Not: Intuitionism and ‘0 = 1’,” Analysis 60(2000): 5-12.