清辨論證方式之檢視——以《般若燈論．觀緣品》與《掌珍論》為線索

An Examination on Bhāviveka's Argument - Taking Da Cheng Zhang Zhen Lun and Prajñāpradīpa as Clues

林恕安(Su-an LIN)

《哲學與文化》 50卷6期 (2023/06) Pp. 3-23

摘要

清辨（Bhāviveka, 500-570A.D.）不同於佛護（Buddhapālita, 470-540 A.D.）、月稱（Candrakīrt, 600-650 A.D.）等中觀學家，以自立論證說明中觀的思想。他接受陳那（Dignāgā, 480-540 A.D.）因明（hetuvidyā），在論辯上多採取宗（pakṣa）、因（hetu）、喻（dṛṣṭānta）三支比量（anumāna）的作法，並以勝義簡別（viśeṣaṇa）說明其中觀的立場。然此簡別的概念雖可見於陳那的《因明正理門論》（Nyāyamukha），例如：「一事有多法，相非一切行，唯由簡別餘，表定能隨逐。」但在甚麼條件下可以運用並未明述於陳那的因明系統中，清辨勝義簡別的使用是否合乎其邏輯，以及簡別的對象應為何者尚待討論。在《掌珍論》（*Karatalaratna）中，清辨以「幻相」作為「真性有為空，如幻緣生故」之同喻能否經得起「除宗有法」的規則亦須檢視。而論辯無為法時則說「無為無有實，不起似空華」，究竟無為法對清辨而言又是如何的存在呢？使用空花作為喻例的用意為何呢？此外，不同於《掌珍論》之情形，清辨的《般若燈論》（Prajñāpradīpa）順著龍樹（Nāgārjuna, 150-250 A.D.）的《中論》（Mūlamadhyamakakārikā）詮釋，但也因此在論辯上顯得不那麼有力，策略上他雖然嘗試將龍樹的說明轉為推論的形式，然在運用上仍有令人質疑之處，此文也將從《般若燈論．觀緣品》一併檢視清辨在此部分的論式及其正當性。

關鍵字

清辨 ； 陳那 ； 簡別對象 ； 幻喻 ； 無為法

並列摘要

Bhāviveka (500-570 A.D.) chose a different approach from Buddhapālita (470-540 A.D.) and Candrakīrt (600-650 A.D.), applying an autonomous (svātantra) syllogism to interpret Madhyamaka's concepts. He adopted Dignāgā (480-540 A.D.) 's logic system (hetuvidyā) and applied the three-part syllogism method containing a proposition (pakṣa), a reason (hetu), and an example (dṛṣṭānta). Especially, he always added the qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of "from the viewpoint of ultimate truth" to the inference. This idea of adding a qualification can also be found in Dignāgā's Nyāyamukha. For example, in verse XVII, we find: "One single object has many attributes (dharmas); and therefore a mark [used as definition] (nimitta) cannot be appropriate to all. Only when we exclude the other[cases], the expression [abhidhāna] follows [the object]." Dignāgā's system does not indicate clearly under what conditions this applies and how it is to be applied; therefore, it remains up for discussion whether Bhāviveka's approach, adding a qualification, is appropriate and what the object of qualification should be. Second, in his work, Da Cheng Zhang Zhen Lun (《大乘掌珍論》 , *Karatalaratna), Bhāviveka used illusions and sky flowers as positive examples (sapakṣa) in the following two inferences: Conditioned things are empty according to the ultimate truth because they are produced by causes and conditions. Just like illusions. Unconditioned things are not real (according to the ultimate truth.) because they are not produced like sky flowers. We must, however, examine whether this positive example can bear the rule of "excluding the pakṣa" (除宗有法) in order not to fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning, in the first case. In addition, it should be determined what the existence of unconditioned things is for him and what the purpose of using the sky flowers as an example is. Finally, Bhāviveka's commentary-Prajñāpradīpa, unlike Da Cheng Zhang Zhen Lun, is an interpretation of Nāgārjuna (150-250 A.D.)'s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. The strength of the debate in this work is therefore somehow restrictive. Bhāviveka sought to interpret that work by transforming its content with the use of inferences, but it should be examined whether his method is reasonable by checking some of the contents in Chap.1 of Prajñāpradīpa.

並列關鍵字

Bhāviveka ； Dignāgā ； The Object of Qualification ； Illusion ； Unconditioned Phenomena

參考文獻

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