「中美共同防禦條約」及其對蔣介石總統反攻大陸政策的限制

韓戰爆發後，美國派遣第七艦隊進入臺灣海峽干預中國未完成的內戰，使中華民國免於完全潰敗。蔣介石總統急於與美國簽訂共同防禦條約，但美國卻將紐西蘭在聯合國安理會提出以緩和1954年金門危機的停火案，列為第一優先處理。美國經由1954年「中美共同防禦條約」、1955年臺海決議案，保護臺灣、金門、馬祖兔於遭受中共侵略，但也限制了蔣介石對中國大陸採取攻擊性的軍事行動。蔣介石在「中美共同防禦條約」簽定之後，讚揚艾森豪總統的領導能力，但很快發現一條約也緊緊限縮他對中國大陸的軍事計畫。從美國政府的觀點，蔣總統在1958年10月與杜勒斯的聯合公報上，承諾不使用武力收復大陸。蔣總統為他的此一疏忽戚到遺慌，也責怪前外交部長葉公超誤將中文「不憑藉武力J '翻譯為英文「不使用武力」。然而，蔣總統認為中華民國在中國大陸革命或動盪時，保有採取防衛性措施的權利，他在1962年主張與美國協商修改「中美共同防禦條約」的必要與迫切性，卻未主動、正式與美國進行此一談判。美國政府官員一再提醒蔣總統共同防禦條約屬於防禦性質，也婉拒蔣介石提議在西藏、印尼、越南等地動用國軍的提議，以免美國的東直外交政策更為複雜。「中美共同防禦條約」雖阻止毛澤東進占福建沿海島嶼，但也限制了蔣介石以軍事手段光復大陸的計畫。

關鍵字

蔣介石；光復大陸；共同防禦條約；艾森豪；甘迺迪

並列摘要

After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the U.S. resolutely decided to intervene in China's yet unfinished civil war by sending the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, which saved the Republic of China (ROC) from the total debacle. President Chiang Kai-shek was eager to have had a mutual defense treaty with the U.S., but the latter opted for the passage of a United Nations Security Council Resolution submitted by New Zealand to defuse the Quemoy crisis in September 1954. Through the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1955 Formosa Resolution, the U.S. protected Taiwan and the offshore islands such as Quemoy and Matsu from invasion by the PRC, but Washington also constrained President Chiang Kai-shek from conducting any offensive actions against the mainland. Chiang praised President Dwight D. Eisenhower for his leadership in signing the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC but soon detected that the treaty had hamstrung his military plans for recovering Mainland China. From the U.S. perspective, President Chiang had committed to not using force to achieve his ＂Recover Mainland China＂ mission in the Chiang-Dulles Joint Communique in October 1958. President Chiang regretted his very negligence and blamed the former foreign minister George Yeh for his English mistranslation of the original Chinese word meaning ＂not resorting to force＂ for ＂not using force＂ as the principal means in the Communique. Chiang believed that the ROC did reserve the right to take defensive countermeasures when there was a revolt or uprising in Mainland China, and he argued it was imperative that when they came to revise the Defense Treaty with the U.S. in 1962, but he somehow failed to initiate such a negotiation. The U.S. government officials time and time again reminded Chiang of the defensive character of the Treaty and declined Chiang's proposal for employing the ROC military forces in any secret activities in Tibet, Indonesia, or Vietnam so as not to complicate the U.S. foreign policy in East Asia. The ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty thwarted Mao Zedong's strategy of liberating the ROC-held offshore islands, but it also prevented Chiang from recovering Mainland China by any military means.