本文建構一個包含中間財產業及最終財產業的兩部門均衡模型,探討對本國中間財產業的保護政策。在中間財產業為獨佔性競爭以及最終財產業為完全競爭的市場結構下,本文依序討論了「對進口中間財課稅」及「對使用本國中間財補貼」兩種保護政策,並且和開發中國家慣常使用的直接管制政策-「本地成份要求」(Local Content Requirement, LCR)作一比較。本文發現,這三種政策確實都具有保護本國中間財產業發展的功效。「對進口中間財課稅」和「對本國中間財的使用補貼」雖然都是改變本國和外國中間財的相對價格,但是所能達成的保護效果,及其肇致之路徑卻截然不同。簡單地說,「對進口中間財課稅」不會影響最終財廠商和生產成本,屬於成本中性的保護;然而「對本國中間財的使用補貼」卻能夠替最終財廠商帶來成本下降的好處。就保護本國中間財產業的效果而言,「等比率關稅政策」不一定能得到和LCR一樣的保護效果,「等比率補貼政策」才是LCR的最佳替代政策。
This paper constructs a 2-industry equilibrium model to investigate the effectiveness of different protection policies in the development of a domestic intermediate input industry. Assuming that the intermediate input industry is monopolistically competitive, and that the final good industry is perfectly competitive, we derive the 2-industry equilibria under tariff and subsidy policies and compare them with that under an LCR policy. We find that a tariff policy will not affect the final good production cost, whereas a subsidy policy will have an additional advantage in reducing this cost. Therefore, a subsidy policy is a better substitute for an LCR policy.