我國庫藏股買回及子公司買回兩種股票購回制度並行的過渡時期,提供了檢測台灣企業股票購回之訊號發射效能的難得契機。與過去文獻對交叉持股之負面觀點相反,本文發現無論是庫藏股買回還是子公司買回之交叉持股宣告皆獲得市場之正面反應並具有股價被市場過份低估之資訊內涵;然而二者中庫藏股買回確為訊號發射效能較強之財務訊號。此外,公司實施庫藏在股買回時,還可將多餘資金發還給股東而達到降低代理成本之功效;而子公司買回亦尚可發揮穩定公司經營權之正面效益。最後本文也發現,當股價被低估的機率越高、公司管理當局越無發射假訊號之誘因時,股票購回之宣告效果也越強烈,並且公司也越傾向選擇以庫藏股買回取代子公司買回來作為財務訊號。
The coexistence period of open-market repurchases and subsidiary buybacks provide s a valuable opportunity to test signaling power of share repurchases in Taiwan. Given the findings that the announcements for both types of share repurchases incur positive market responses and possess the information contents of undervalued share prices, this paper strongly supports the signaling hypothesis. The evidence also confirms that open-market repurchases have stronger signaling power than subsidiary buybacks In addition, I find that open-market repurchases can reduce agency cost of equity through the distribution of excess capital to stockholders, while subsidiary buybacks help current management keep controlling the firm Finally, this paper reveals that the announcement effect is more pronounced when the probability of stock undervaluation is higher and the management has less incentive to send false signals, both of which then further increase the possibility of choosing open-market repurchases as financial signals.