透過您的圖書館登入
IP:3.21.158.148
  • 期刊

Compensation Incentives, Employment Risk and Intended Risk-Taking in the Taiwan Mutual Fund Industry

台灣共同基金經理人意圖性風險承擔行為之研究

摘要


本研究檢測台灣共同基金經理人的風險承擔行為是否會受到報酬動機與雇用動機之相對強度所影響。研究證實,多頭市場期間台灣共同基金經理人的風險承擔行為會受到報酬動機所影響,上半年基金績效較差的經理人,在下半年時會增加較多的風險;但在空頭市場期間,雇用風險卻會使上半年輸家在下半年時降低投資組合風險。

並列摘要


This paper examines the effects of compensation incentives and employment risk on intended risk-taking of fund managers. We find that in a bull market when compensation incentives are relatively strong, midyear losers tend to increase their risk more than midyear winners in an attempt to catch up with them. In a bear market when employment risk dominates, midyear losers engage in less risk-taking.

參考文獻


Almazan, Andres,Brown, Keith C.,Carlson, Murray,Chapman, David A.(2004).Why constrain your mutual fund manager?.Journal of Financial Economics.73,289-321.
Atkinson, Stanley M.,Baird, Samantha B.,Frye, Melissa B.(2003).Do female mutual fund managers manage differently?.Journal of Financial Research.26,1-18.
Avery, Christopher N.,Chevalier, Judith A.(1999).Herding over the career.Economics Letters.53,327-333.
Bajtelsmit, Vickie L.,VanDerhei, Jack L.(1997).Risk aversion and retirement income adequacy.Positioning Pensions for the Year 2000.(Positioning Pensions for the Year 2000).
Bloom, Matt,Milkovich, George T.(1998).Relationships among risk, incentive pay and organizational performance.Academy of Management Journal.43,283-297.

延伸閱讀