強制性與自願性財務預測制度下外部監理機制與財務盈餘預測精準度之關聯性

本研究旨在探討我國財務預測制度由「強制性財務預測」更改為採用「自願性財務預測」後，比較不同制度下公司財務盈餘預測精準度（盈餘預測誤差）的情形，並透過三項外部監理機制（主管機關審閱、會計師核閱與分析師關注次數）檢視是否對於公司財務盈餘預測精準度有所影響。本研究結果發現，我國由強制性財務預測制度改為採行自願性財務預測制度後，公司的財務盈餘預測精準度確實有所提升，但兩制度間的盈餘預測精準度並不具統計上的顯著差異性，其中自願性財務預測制度下有意願揭露財務預測資訊的公司家數有大幅下降且遞減之趨勢。在外部監理機制對財務盈餘預測精準度的實證結果中，則顯示主管機關審閱對於財務盈餘預測精準度呈現顯著的影響；會計師核閱與分析師關注次數則對於財務盈餘預測精準度無統計上的顯著影響。此外，研究亦發現盈餘損失或負債比率較高的公司，會發布樂觀型但較不精準的財務盈餘預測；而有現金增資的公司，則會傾向發布保守型且較為精準的財務盈餘預測。

關鍵字

盈餘預測精準度；強制性財務預測；自願性財務預測；外部監理機制

並列摘要

This study investigates Taiwan's financial earnings forecast system changing form mandatory financial earnings forecast to voluntary financial earnings forecast. We compare the forecast accuracy between two different systems and investigate how external supervision mechanisms (authorities' warning, accountant review and analysts' interest) affect the forecast accuracy. In the result, first, we find that the number of management financial earnings forecast decreases in the voluntary financial forecast system. Second, the accuracy of financial earnings forecast increases in the voluntary financial forecast system than the mandatory financial forecast system; however, the result is not statistical significant difference between these two systems. Third, the empirical results indicate that the authorities' warning (one of the external supervision mechanisms) significantly affects the accuracy of financial earnings forecast; nevertheless, accountant review and analysts' interest do not appear any statistical significance. Lastly, this study also finds that a firm with earnings loss and higher debt ratio prefers to disclose optimistic but inaccuracy earnings forecast; the capital increased firm inclines to release conservative but accuracy earnings forecast.