- 期刊
父母責任、管轄規則與實體法方法論相關議題評析
Comments on Issues Relating to Parental Responsibility, Jurisdiction Rule and Substantive Law Methodology
摘要
個人之所以從未評析過國內判決，最主要乃因堅信任何國家之任何判決皆應符合現今國際私法之趨勢、主要政策、及主流價值之故。根據個人之經驗，任何國家之判決，自然包括我國之判決在內，如若違背國際私法之主流價值，終將被潮流所淘汰。然如大英帝國協最高法院半世紀以前在McKee中所說「於監護權問題上小孩之幸福與快樂是最高之考慮原則……在這最高考慮原則下所有其他之考慮必須退讓」，故個人決定對較近有關父母責任之案件加以評論。本著實體法論之法學方法論，個人極度驚訝的發現我國教育制度及措施已經嚴重的違反聯合國兒童權利公約第31條。以個人終生研究國際私法之職業生涯而言，比起這個明目張膽的違背國際公法及或許所謂是目前世上唯一的統一的國際私法上之公共政策之行為，個人從未見過有任何其他之行為比這個行為更令人厭惡。在配合海牙會議之規則下，個人嘗試將慣居地下一定義。除了於剛抵達之新移民外，一個人於一特定地方相當長久之居留（亦即「常居地」），應滿足構成慣居地之要件。雖然海牙會議與歐盟皆採納慣居地做為父母責任之主要管轄基礎，個人卻認為父母離婚法院應列為主要優先之管轄法院。但是與現今擴大離婚法院之管轄基礎之趨勢不同的是，個人追隨傳統上之方式，認為應該只有一個專屬之離婚法院──亦即被告配偶之住所地（或慣居地）法院。個人並且認為大陸法系應注意英美法於「分割式離婚」之作法，這種身分問題與財產問題分開之作法符合現今流動性大之社會之需求。自從the Spiliada後，英國傳統上之「困擾性及壓迫性」主義於許多地方已被「不方便法院」主義所取代。根據我國民訴國內之管轄基礎，及引用英國作法，個人建議即使我國法院對一個案件有管轄權，亦即根據我國民訴之國內管轄規則將訴訟之通知於國內送達給被告，我國法院於某些特別情形下可根據不方便法院原則而有裁量權去停止訴訟。根據相同之民訴國內管轄基礎及英國作法，個人更進一步建議於某些特別情形下，我國法院基於方便法院之原則，亦應有裁量權將訴訟之通知送達於國外之被告，而依我國民訴之國內管轄規則主張案件之管轄權。至於在國際離婚之管轄基礎上，在目前尚無立法之情形下，個人建議或許我國應本著民訴568 條之規定，而以婚姻住所地及夫妻任何一方之慣居地為國際離婚案件之管轄基礎。又如若基於我國傳統上保護婦女之基本政策，則可將慣居地侷限於被告配偶之慣居地。最後非常遺憾的於Willis L. M. Reese教授仙逝甚久後，個人才對他給予個人之回應再給予遲來的回應。一如往昔之論調，其堅持平衡各種價值乃為選法規則所不可避免之作法，而個人則認為實體法中所包含的各種政策之考量通常應可涵蓋及處理大部分其所珍惜的價值於各方面之考量。
並列摘要
Due to the conviction that any judgment made in any country should be in accord with the trends, dominating policies or prevailing values of modern conflict of laws, I have never commented on any of our judgments before. However as the Privy Council said in McKee more than half century ago ”the welfare and happiness of the infant is the paramount consideration in question of custody……to this paramount consideration all others yield”, I have decided to comment on the recent cases concerning parental responsibility.Basing on substantive law methodology, I am amazed to find that our educational systems and practice have severely violated Art. 31 of Convention on the Rights of the Child. Through out my career as a conflicts lawyer, I have never seen any act more repulsive than this blatant violation of public international law and this unified of conflict of laws.In conformity with Hague Conferences, I attempted to give habitual residence a definition. Except in the situation of newly arrived immigrants, a person's presence over a fairly prolonged period in a certain place (ordinary residence) should be able to suffice the requirements of habitual residence. In spite of both Hague Conferences and the E.U. adopt habitual residence as the prime jurisdictional basis for parental responsibility; I believe that divorce court should be on the top of the priority order. However contrary to the modern trend of following the traditional approach increasing the jurisdictional bases for divorces, I also believe there should be only one single exclusive divorce court-the court of the domicile (or habitual residence) of the defendant spouse. The civilian world will also have to take notice that the common law practices of divisible divorce certainly serve the need of modern society.In England since the Spiliada, the ”vexation and oppression” test has been largely replaced by ”forum non convenience” doctrine.Basing on our domestic jurisdictional grounds, and following the English approach, I propose that even though a Taiwanese court has power to try a case, i.e. a claim from has been served on the defendant in Taiwan in accordance with our domestic jurisdictional rules, it has a discretion to stay on the basis of forum non convenience in certain specific situations. Basing on the same English approach and same domestic jurisdictional rules, I further propose that the court will also have the discretionary power to allow service of a claim form out the jurisdiction on the basis of forum convenience in certain specific situations.Finally, a rather belated and posthumous reply to late professor Willis L. M. Reese. As always he insisted that a balancing of values was inevitable, and I insist that the policies contained in substantive law normally should have covered most aspects of his cherished values.