不確定需求與高產能成本之寡佔產業的產能策略賽局模式

A Gaming Model of Capacity Strategy Analysis for an Oligopoly Industry of Uncertain Demand and High Investment Cost

陳馨宇(Nicole Chen) ； 陳永豐(Y-F Chen) ； 周雍強(Yon-Chun Chou)

《科技管理學刊》 12卷2期 (2007/06) Pp. 65-92

https://doi.org/10.6378/JTM.200706.0065

摘要

許多高科技製造產業具有產品需求不確定、產能投資成本高、技術更迭快等特性，在這樣的環境，經營風險高，弱勢廠商容易被市場所淘汰，產業結構通常由產業發展初期的眾多廠商競逐，逐漸演變為寡佔產業，又由於景氣循環現象非常劇烈，產能供給與需求經常發生失衡，產能投資的抉擇不僅決定經營獲利，也會影響廠商的長期競爭力，因此產能投資是廠商的重要決策。在產業發展初期，由於市場成長快，各家廠商的產能計畫大致可以依據本身的成本、價格、需求等資料而制訂，不須或不易顧慮競爭者的可能計畫，但是寡佔市場逐漸成形之後，各廠商的需求會發生密切的關係，賽局因此成為產能規劃的重要情境考量。本文針對具有不確定需求、高產能成本與寡佔特性的半導體製造產業，以競局探討競逐者的可能產能策略。本文首先以產業數據分析製造成本、需求與營收的歷史走勢，討論不確定需求、高產能成本對產業結構的影響。其次，以個別廠商不考慮競爭者的產能決策為前提，以營益為產能擴充的績效目標，建構面對不確定需求時產能水準的數學優化模式，所得之產能水準稱為微觀產能。廠商基於競局考量可以在微觀產能水準的基礎上採用更激進策略或仍然秉持微觀最佳產能，本文接著提出一個賽局模式，用以分析領先者與跟隨者採取這兩種策略的預期營益，並以產業數據推算，得到均衡解，並推理結論：寡佔產業的製造廠商，當面對有差異的邊際利潤、有差異的需求變異以及高比重的產能攤提成本，領導廠商可採用激進產能策略，一方面可提高本身營利，另一方面還能壓縮跟隨廠商的營利，因此，產能擴充的決策可作為領導廠商的競爭手段。

關鍵字

產能競爭策略 ； 寡佔競爭 ； 賽局模式 ； 半導體製造 ； 競爭策略

並列摘要

Many high-tech manufacturing industries are faced with uncertain product demand, high capacity investment cost, and rapid technology advancement. These characteristics tend to weed out weaker firms and drive the industries toward an oligopoly as they pass the embryonic stage. Recent examples of such industries include semiconductor manufacturing and liquid crystal display manufacturing. In an oligopoly, a firm can not afford to make capacity decisions based on cost-benefit analysis alone, potential actions of rival firms must be taken into consideration. In this paper, a gaming analysis of capacity strategy in oligopoly competition with high irreversible investment cost and high demand uncertainty is described by using industry data of semiconductor manufacturing. The competition state of the industry is first described by analyzing the trends of average selling price, materials and labor cost, operating expenses, and capacity cost of representative firms. Using a Brownian motion process model for capacity demand, an optimal capacity model that a firm might undertake while disregarding the rival firm's action is next presented. This model is based on tradeoffs in operating income between the consequences of over-capacity and under-capacity. Finally, gaming analysis is presented for the interaction between two leading firms in the oligopoly. By comparing the outcomes of aggressive and conservative strategies of capacity investment, a conclusion is drawn. In an oligopolistic manufacturing industry with differentiated marginal profits, high capacity cost, and differentiated demand volatility between firms, the leading firm should adopt an aggressive capacity strategy.

並列關鍵字

Capacity Strategy ； Oligopoly Competition ； Game Theory ； Semiconductor Manufacturing ； Capacity Investment Strategy

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