Human Capital Accumulation and Incentive Contracts: A Theoretical Perspective

人力資本累積與誘因契約：理論分析

李堯賢(Yao-Hsien Lee) ； 呂英瑞(Ying-Jui Lu) ； 陳煌儒(Huang-Ju Chen) ； 陳欽楨(Chin-Chen Chen)

《Pan-Pacific Management Review》 9卷2期 (2006/07) Pp. 1-17

https://doi.org/10.30166/PPMR.200607.0001

摘要

本文針對具有長期契約關係之當事人與代理人，利用誘因契約之微分賽局模型分析代理人在成本縮減活動中的專屬關係投資決策。本文證明代理人的人力資本累積在決定代理人成本縮減努力與道德危險以及當事人最適誘因契約的重要性。本文的研究結果如下：(1)代理人的道德危險程度不但決定於成本彈性也決定貼現率，人力資本折舊率與承諾期間；(2)若代理人的道德危險程度嚴重，則當事人的成本分擔率將會比較高；(3)成本分擔與道德危險在動態的架構下的取捨關係不一定成立。

關鍵字

微分賽局 ； 人力資本累積 ； 誘因契約

並列摘要

This paper utilizes a differential game model of incentive contracts in which both the principal and the agent have long-term supplier relations, which lead the agent to make relation-specific investment in cost-reducing effort activities. We then demonstrate the importance of the agent's human capital accumulation in determining the agent's cost-reducing effort level and moral hazard and the principal's optimal incentive contracts. The results show that (1) the degree of the agent's moral hazard is determined not only by cost flexibility but also by the rate of discount, the rate of depreciation of human capital, and the period commitment; (2) the principal's cost-sharing ratio will be higher if the agent's moral hazard is serious; and (3) the trade-off relationship between cost-sharing and moral hazard does not necessarily hold in the dynamic framework.

並列關鍵字

Differential game ； Human capital accumulation ； Incentive contract

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