Does Governance Mechanism Affect the Disclosures of Top Management's Compensation?

公司治理機制是否影響高階管理當局之薪酬揭露？

陳俊合(Chun-Ho Chen) ； 許永聲(Yun-Sheng Hsu) ； 翁慈青(Tzu-Ching Weng) ； 紀信義(Hsin-Yi Chi)

《Pan-Pacific Management Review》 16卷2期 (2013/07) Pp. 103-132

摘要

本文探討公司治理機制對高階管理當局薪酬揭露透明度之影響，本文結果顯示，當高階管理當局持股比率越高，則其薪酬揭露透明度較高。相對而言，當董事會中執行董事比率越高、控制權與現金流量權偏離程度越高以及董事長兼任總經理時，則其薪酬揭露透明度較低。總而言之，本文結果指出當公司治理機制較弱時，會產生較大的代理問題，並導致其高階管理當局薪酬揭露透明度較低。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 揭露 ； 薪酬 ； 資訊透明度

並列摘要

The paper examines the role of corporate governance in the disclosure of top management’s compensation. We find that companies with higher levels of top management shareholding provide greater transparency in their compensation disclosures. By contrast, firms with a higher proportion of executive directors, the greater divergence between the control and cash flow rights and CEO duality, will have a lower transparency of compensation disclosures. In summary, our findings suggest that firms with weaker governance mechanism have a greater agency problem and a lower transparency of top management’s compensation disclosures.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； disclosure ； compensation ； information transparency

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