股權結構與董監事組成對大股東代理問題的影響：電子業與非電子業之比較

葉銀華(Yin-Hua Yeh)

《台灣金融財務季刊》 10卷1期 (2009/03) Pp. 1-28

摘要

有別於過去文獻著重於國家與公司層級，本文嘗試分析產業類型對於股權結構與董（監）事會組成的影響。由於並沒有文獻探討此一議題，本文針對台灣股市電子業與非電子業的股權結構、董（監）事組成的差異性進行探索性的研究，並且比較與解釋電子業與非電子業大股東代理問題的差異。實證結果發現電子業最大股東成員擔任董事、監事比率顯著低於非電子業。而且相對於非電子業，電子業最大股東較少利用子投資公司的交叉持股方式與較少採用股權質押來增加其對公司的控制權；同時電子業最大股東之投票權偏離現金流量權幅度亦低於非電子業。而這些實證結果在固定最終控制型態（例如：同樣是家族控股公司）、其他特性變數的影響（包括：在控制研發費用比率、外國機構持股比率和公司規模效果等）以及將產業細分類後仍然存在。綜合本文的發現，電子業大股東代理問題比非電子業輕。

關鍵字

股權結構 ； 董事會組成 ； 代理問題 ； 公司監理 ； 產業結構

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of the industry structure upon ownership structure and board composition. Whether the industry structure will alter the agency costs derived from the ownership structure and board composition has not been studied yet. This study analyzes and compares the difference of agency problems caused by controlling shareholder including ownership structure and board composition attributes between sample companies in electronic and non-electronic industry. The empirical results find that the ratio of the directors and supervisors held by the controlling shareholder in electronic industry is significantly lower than in non-electronic industry. Moreover, comparing non-electronic industry, the controlling shareholder less use the ways of cross shareholding through subsidiary and stock collateralizing to enhance the control right to the company. In the meanwhile, the degree of the deviation of the control rights to cash flow rights is lower in electronic industry than in non-electronic industry. These empirical results are still found even controlling the types of ultimate control, the effects of other characteristic variables, and subdividing the industries. Integrating the empirical results of this study, there is fewer the agency problems caused by controlling shareholder in electronic industry than in non-electronic industry.

並列關鍵字

Ownership Structure ； Board Composition ； Agency Problem ； Corporate Governance ； Industrial Structure

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