本研究探討台灣的銀行是否可經由合併來提升經營效率。首先我們從主併及被併銀行角度以資料包絡法分析合併前後之效率,其次比較當公民營銀行為主(被)併銀行時,兩者合併前後之效率有何不同;最後採用Tobit迴歸模型輔以拔靴抽樣法探討公民營銀行合併效率與公司治理之關聯性。 實證結果發現:在主併銀行效率中,公營銀行無論在合併前後平均效率皆比民營銀行來得好,此與其他文獻結論不同。被合併之民營銀行中有的因效率較差被合併、有些效率不差,然基於自身未來策略發展而願意被合併;有些公營銀行雖然效率較好,可見因需配合政府政策推動而願意被合併。若公營銀行之股份盈餘偏離倍數與席次股份偏離倍數愈大,民營銀行之董監質押比例愈高、資產規模較小及經理人持股比例較低者,較易產生代理問題導致合併效率較差。一般而言,公營銀行應積極參與銀行整併,而參與合併活動的民營銀行則應注意其經營者的實際持股比重,以避免道德危機。
This research studies whether banks in Taiwan may enhance their operational efficiency through mergers. We first use the data envelopment analysis to investigate bank efficiency before and after merger events from the acquiring and acquired bank point of view. We then compare the efficiency of government controlled banks and privately owned banks. At last, we use Tobit regression model accompanied with a bootstrapping method to study the relationship between the corporate governance and the efficiency of bank mergers with different controlling interests. Our results indicate that the efficiency of government controlled banks, acquiring or acquired, is better than that of privately owned banks. This is different from previous studies. Among the privately owned banks merged, some were merged because of poor efficiency; others which had better efficiency were merged probably based on its strategic plan and willing to be merged. As to some government controlled banks, although their efficiency was better but because they needed to comply with government's policy so that they were willing to be merged. Government controlled banks which had a smaller deviation between voting right and cash flow right and deviation between the proportion of board members controlled by the ultimate owners to the board size and voting right were more efficient. Privately owned banks which had a lower director and supervisor pledge ratio, a more shareholdings by managers or a larger asset size were more efficient. According our results, government controlled banks in general should participate more aggressively in banking mergers, and privately owned banks involving mergers should have more actual shareholdings by top management to prevent the possibility of moral hazard.