控制權爭取、控制權私人利益與最佳證券設計

Control Right Contest, Private Benefit of Control and Optimal Security Design

李春安(Chun-An Li) ； 劉維琪(Victor W. Liu)

《台灣管理學刊》 2卷1期 (2002/08) Pp. 125-148

https://doi.org/10.6295/TAMJ.2002.0201.07

摘要

在控制權爭取的過程中，私人利益為隱藏於背後的重要動機。本研究嘗試從私人利益觀點，以賽局觀念建構一個可以合理詮釋證券契約設計的理論，並解釋為何權益型證券可以擁有控制權，但卻只能得到剩餘求償權，準負債(quasi-debt)型證券沒有控制權，但卻可以有優先求償權的謎題。研究結果顯示，在資訊對稱的情境下，只要約定的現金流量分配比率為契約當事人所接受，該證券契約即是最佳設計；但是在資訊不對稱的情境下，本研究證明，唯有取得控制權者須分配到具剩餘求償權特性的權益型證券，未取得控制權者須分配到具優先求償權特性的準負債型證券，證券契約的設計方能達到最佳。同時，本研究的結果亦顯示，金融中介提供的標準型負債，可以改善證券設計的效率。

關鍵字

公司控制 ； 控制權私人利益 ； 證券設計

並列摘要

The private benefits are an unobservable important motivation in control right contest. In this paper, we employ game approach to establish a theory of optimal security design from the perspective of private benefits of control. We find that under information symmetry, when the distribution of a firm's cash flow is accepted by contracting parties, the contract is an optimal design. Under information asymmetry, the contract is an optimal design if and only if the security with residual claims is assigned to who gets the control rights, and the security with prior claims is assigned to who doesn't get the control rights. Moreover, the standard debt contract provided by financial intermediary will improve the efficiency of security design.

並列關鍵字

Control rights ； Private benefits of control ； Security design

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