In this paper, we analyses the optimal licensing strategies and R&D subsidy in an endogenous R&D model. Two conclusions are: (1) When the R&D efficiency is high, the fixed-fee is the optimal licensing strategy; otherwise, the royalty is the optimal licensing strategy. (2) When 5/3<γ<1.90, the fixed-fee is social optimal and the patentee's optimal strategy; when 1.98<γ<3.93, the royalty is social optimal and the patentee's optimal strategy. Our results are different from the finding of Wang (1998, 2002) and Muto (1993).
In this paper, we analyses the optimal licensing strategies and R&D subsidy in an endogenous R&D model. Two conclusions are: (1) When the R&D efficiency is high, the fixed-fee is the optimal licensing strategy; otherwise, the royalty is the optimal licensing strategy. (2) When 5/3<γ<1.90, the fixed-fee is social optimal and the patentee's optimal strategy; when 1.98<γ<3.93, the royalty is social optimal and the patentee's optimal strategy. Our results are different from the finding of Wang (1998, 2002) and Muto (1993).