從柏格森到阿布瓦希：論集體記憶的本質

什麼是「集體記憶」？現在的社會學研究在這方面如何將「記憶」與過去的經驗區分？我們從「集體記憶」一詞的創造者阿布瓦希的作品中，發現他某種程度上借用了他的老師柏格森的記憶理論，以致於對「集體記憶」本質的爭論也常可以說是對柏格森「記憶」理論的爭辯。例如，「集體記憶」的建構性質較強，抑或一個社會的「集體記憶」應當更傾向連續性？為了解決這個問題，本文回到柏格森的哲學，從「記憶」的本質，「記憶」的使用等命題開始，由原初的柏格森理論中去尋找答案。透過兩種對「集體記憶」本質的相對看法，我們進一步解釋了「記憶」與「歷史」的差異，並希望藉著概念的釐清，為「集體記憶」的研究鋪陳適當的理論基礎。

關鍵字

柏格森；阿布瓦希；記憶理論；集體記憶；綿延

並列摘要

What is ”collective memory”? Is it different to ”history” or other types of our experiences? This essay deals with the problem of the concept of the ”memory”, originated from the French philosopher Henri Bergson and adopted by Bergson's pupil, the sociologist, Maurice Halbwachs, in his works in term of ”collective memory”. Since Halbwachs ”collective memory” is essentially a revision of Bergson's ”memory”, it would inevitably be criticized from the points of view that either do not notice or even misread the original formulation of Bergson's theory, for example, the debates focus on the nature of ”collective memory” whether should be ”reconstructed” (E. Hobsbawm) or ”continuous” (B. Schwartz). The underlying essay would prove that these debates neglect the essential distinction between ”perception” and ”memory”, a very basic component of Bergson's theory of memory. If we can put attention on this distinction, then it would be clear why ”collective memory” could be both ”reconstructed” and ”continuous”, and finally this essay will argue why ”collective memory” is actually differentiated from ”history”, so as to formulate a theoretical basis for the so called ”study of collective memory”.