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第七次修憲後民進黨推動第二階段憲改之歷程與走向

The Process and Trend of the Second-phase Constitutional Re-engineering Initiated by DPP after the 7(superscript th) Constitutional Amendment

摘要


自2005年任務型國民大會代表複決通過第七次修憲案,陳水扁總統宣示啟動「第二階段憲政改造」工程,民進黨並於2006年9月正式提出完整憲改草案。有別於前七次修憲,民進黨採取全新策略:直接修改本文,強化人權保障,並以全套的憲政體制為改革訴求,面對主權爭議也採取彈性手段。而第七次修憲後,「廢除國大」使我國走向單一國會,修憲案複決權集中立法院行使;「國會席次減半」使得第七屆起立法委員在憲改過程之影響力倍增,政黨推動憲改過程中必須更加重視個別立委的利益與需求,並投入更高的遊說成本凝聚共識;而立法院複決修憲案採超高門檻設計,導致任何修憲提案必須符合「國會集體利益」或「公民集體利益」方能順利通過;至於「公投入憲」的設計,則有效抑制憲改過程中「國會集體利益」極大化傾向。在此前提下,可預見未來我國憲改,將朝向以國會為主的憲政體制,並強化人民權利為主要改革方向。

並列摘要


After the Ad-hoc National Assembly passed the 7(superscript th) constitutional amendment in 2005, President Chen put forward a policy statement for ”the second phase constitutional re-engineering”. DPP started drafting a new constitution and released a complete constitutional reform draft proposal in September 2006. What is different from the previous amendments is that DPP's current approach to reform has the flexibility for the dispute on the issue of sovereignty and calls for a direct revision of the main body of the constitution, increasing the protection of human rights, and a universal reform of the constitutional system. The 7(superscript th) amendment abolishes the National Assembly and reduces the number of the legislator to a half. In the unicameral parliamentary system, the power to amend the constitution vests in the Legislative Yuan. The effect of ”halving the number of legislator” gives more power to legislators in the process of constitution reforms. As a result, political parties have to pay more attention to individual legislator's needs and interests, as well as directing more resources towards lobbying in order to yield a consensus. The impossibly high constitutional revisions threshold for passage requires any proposal for revision to be consistent with the collective interests of the parliament or the collective interests of the citizens. As for the new constitutional right to referendum, it may serve as the checks and balances on the parliamentary collective interests. In this context, it is foreseeable that the direction for the future constitutional reform in Taiwan is heading towards a parliamentary constitutional system, and at the same time increasing the protection of human rights.

被引用紀錄


許恒禎(2013)。半總統制下不同政府型態之成因─台灣、蒙古、波蘭及其他後列寧民主國家〔博士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.02488
彭艾喬(2008)。台灣新憲法運動之研究─兩岸關係下的機會與限制〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.02679

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