預售屋代銷業法制規範之經濟分析

Economic Analysis on Law of Sale Broking Agency in Pre-Sale House Markets

游淑滿(Shu-Man You) ； 曾明遜(Ming-Hsun Tseng)

《財產法暨經濟法》 17期 (2009/03) Pp. 93-135

https://doi.org/10.29825/PELJ.200903.0003

摘要

預售屋爲一符號產品，預售屋購屋者僅能依附於廣告、文宣、宣傳及樣品屋等資訊以決定購買決策，而代銷業者即爲預售屋的主要資訊傳遞者。預售屋代銷業者之職責在將所欲形構的預售屋產品內涵轉化爲預售崖的符號象徵，進而賦與消費者對於未來預售屋產品建造完成後之可預期遠景，促使買賣雙方合意簽訂買賣契約。然而，因資訊不對稱之狀態易促使預售屋購屋者於交易過程中常居於弱勢情境，致產生認知落差而衍生交易糾紛。
良善的法制規範與實踐，將有助於縮減交易糾紛的成本，增益交易合作的經濟剩餘。爲了尋求有效代銷業之法制規範與實踐，本文利用法律經濟學研究途徑，以交易成本闡釋資訊傳遞的代銷業者於預售屋交易市場之經濟意涵，探討預售屋代銷業者事前行政管制與事後賠償法制規範之經濟效果。分析結果顯示，在良善法制規範與實踐下，代銷業者在預售屋市場中可同時降低建商與購屋者之交易成本，符合規範性的Coase定理。
然而良善法制規範的實踐決定於是否能完全的監督與執行。在完全監督與執行之事前行政管制規範與事後損害賠償責任下，代銷業者較可完全內部化負外部性。但在不完全監督與執行之事前行政管制規範與事後損害賠償責任下，代銷業者僅部分內部化負外部性。基於代銷業者較高程度內部化其負外部性考量，本文認爲宜將事前行政管制與事後損害賠償視爲互補法制規範制度。在此互補法制規範制度下，預期將可適度降低預售屋代銷業者之不完善服務品質供給，提昇預售屋交易市場的經濟效率。

關鍵字

預售屋 ； 代銷業 ； 法律經濟學 ； 交易成本 ； 事前行政管制 ； 事後賠償責任

並列摘要

Pre-sale houses are a product of symbols. Pre-sale house buyers make decisions based on advertisements, campaigns, promotions, and the information about the sample houses, while sale brokering agencies are the main message-carrier of the pre-sale houses. Sale broking agency's responsibility is to transfer the pre-sale houses to symbols and this makes a built house foreseeable to the consumers in pre-sale house market, which encourages both sides to sign a contract. However, asymmetric information usually puts purchasers in a less advantaged position and different recognitions often cause disputes over the purchase between sellers and buyers.
Appropriate legal regulations and practices could reduce the cost of trade disputes and increase economic surplus of business cooperation. In searching effective regulations and practices for the sale broking agency industry, this study adopted the perspective of law and economics research, and used business cost to explain the economic implication of sale broking agencies in the pre-sale real estate market, in order to discuss the economic effect of the ex-ante administrative regulation and ex-post liability for harm of pre-sale house sale brokering agencies. The result analysis showed that under appropriate legal regulations and practices, sale brokering agencies are able to reduce the business costs of both developers and homebuyers in the pre-sale house market to meet the normalized Coase theory.
However, the practice of appropriate legal regulations depends on complete supervision and execution. Under complete supervision and execution of ex-ante administrative regulation and ex-post liability for harm, agencies are more likely to internalize negative externalities. However, under incomplete supervision and execution of ex-ante administrative regulation and ex-post liability for harm, sale brokering agencies are only able to partially internalize negative externalities. Given sale brokering agencies' high frequency of negative externality internalization, this study proposed that ex-ante administrative regulation and ex-post liability for harm should be taken as complimentary legal regulations. Under this complimentary regulation, sale brokering agency's' incomplete service quality supply is expected to moderately decrease, and the economic efficiency in the pre-sale house market is expected to rise.

並列關鍵字

pre-sale house ； sale broking agency ； economic analysis of law ； transaction costs ； ex ante administrative regulation ； ex post liability for harm