「中國式政治經濟景氣循環」：中央與地方領導菁英之鍊結與互動

＂POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS＂: THE LINK AND INTERACTION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL ELITES OF THE CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

張娟瑄(Chuan-Hsuan Chang)

《國立臺灣科技大學人文社會學報》 16卷1期 (2020/03) Pp. 93-124

摘要

政治經濟景氣循環（political business cycle） 理論對於非民主、封閉的中共政體有著高度適用性。過往文獻即指出，中國大陸的經濟景氣循換現象，係以中央政治局委員會每五年換屆為一輪的固定循環。惟由於過往相關研究，傾向將央地政治菁英分割為兩獨立群體，忽略央地領導人之間的非正式政治關係，以致較難解釋政治經濟景氣循環緊縮年中，為何還存在高經濟發展之特例地區。本文結合政治經濟景氣循環、晉升錦標賽、派系與政治關係等理論，以1992～2011年之景氣循環緊縮年（1994、1999、2004、2009）為觀察對象，分析中央政治局常委與省（市）委書記間的非正式政治關係，對地方GDP成長率表現的影響。實證結果發現，央地領導人間是否有非正式政治關係及關係強烈程度，對於當地GDP成長率之表現具高度顯著的正向影響力。

關鍵字

政治經濟景氣循環 ； 央地關係 ； 晉升錦標賽 ； 派系政治

並列摘要

The theory of political and business cycles has a high degree of applicability to the nondemocratic and closed Chinese Communist Party regime - taking the phenomenon of a fixed five-year rotation of leadership in the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau as a clear example. However, this theory excessively divides the central and local political elites into two independent groups but fails to address the influence of the informal political relations between the central and local political elites. As a result, it comes short of explaining the reason why there are exceptions for some regions to enjoy a high degree of economic development during the austerity years of the political business cycles. By combining the theories of the political business cycles, promotion tournament, and political relations, this paper takes the austerity years of business cycles (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009) between 1992 and 2011 as the object of observation, and analyzes the impact of the informal political relations between the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the provincial party secretaries on the performance of local GDP growth rates. The empirical findings show that the existence and degree of intensity of informal political relations between the leaders of the central and local governments have a highly significant and positive influence on the performance of local GDP growth rates. Moreover, the characteristics of Mainland China's political business cycles shaped by Jiang and Hu during their tenure also continued during Xi Jinping's first term of office.

並列關鍵字

political business cycle ； central-local relations ； promotion tournament ； factional politics

參考文獻

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