通路權力與通路結構於垂直差異模型的應用

An Application of Vertical Differentiation Model on Channel Power and Channel Structure

曾博泰(Bo-Tai Tzeng) ； 李娓瑋(Wei-Wei Lee) ； 管文麒(Wen-Chi Kuan)

《大漢學報》 26期 (2012/12) Pp. 1-31

https://doi.org/10.29704/JDIT.201212.0001

摘要

本研究將垂直差異模型應用在行銷通路議題，探討通路權力與通路結構如何影響廠商在高、低品質市場的選擇行為。通路權力分成納許議價（NB）、製造商領導 （MS）、零售商（RS）以及垂直納許（VN）四種型態。通路結構則分成共同經銷（2M1R）與獨家經銷（2M2R）兩種制度。本研究發現：在不同通路權力下，廠商利潤的排序並不確定，視產品的替代性而定。在不同的通路結構下，零售商偏愛共同經銷，而製造商偏愛獨家經銷的配銷方式。

關鍵字

垂直差異模型 ； 通路權力 ； 通路結構 ； 納許議價

並列摘要

This study applies a vertical differentiation model to the issues of marketing channel. It discusses how channel power and channel structure affect the optimal behavior of up- and down-stream firms in the high- and low-quality markets. Channel power can be classified as Nash Bargaining (NB), Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), and Vertical Nash (VN), while channel structure can be classified as common dealing (2M1R) and exclusive dealing (2M2R).Under different channel power, the sequences of firm's profits are indeterminate, which depends on the substitutability of goods. Under different channel structure, retailers prefer the common dealing while manufacturers prefer the exclusive dealing system.

並列關鍵字

Vertical differentiation ； Channel power ； Channel structure ； Nash bargaining