關懷倫理學的規範性

自從Gillgan（1982）發表《不同聲音》以來，關懷倫理學和正義倫理學就處於分庭抗禮的地位。三十年以來，就關懷和正義兩種價值關係的相關探討，或對立、或折衷、或化約，如Darwall（2002）、Slote（2007）將關懷納入正義體系之中。在此發展的背景下，Held（2006）主張關懷倫理學的規範性具有雙重意義，一方面是拒絕將關懷納入正義倫理學，德性論亦然；另一方面是以關懷為價值的規範性體系，評量與修正關懷實踐，標榜關懷為政治價值。本文旨在於推展Held的理論企圖，嘗試從關懷價值與關懷實踐互為進益的關係中，亦即：關懷價值必需仰賴關懷實踐的啟發；反之，好的關懷實踐必須奠定在關懷價值之上，申論關懷既是倫理價值也是政治價值。本文的論證策略：從Kolodny、Darwall和Slote等傳統規範性倫理學者的觀點來補充說明關懷價值的實質內容，從而以關懷價值是全面性道德來吸收、容納與包含傳統規範性理論的公正與無私的政治價值。

關鍵字

關懷倫理學；規範性；關懷價值；關懷實踐；全面性道德

並列摘要

The publication of In a Different Voice (Gilligan, 1982) has been a significant event in the development of women's way of thinking. Ethics of care, which is different from male (main) stream moral theory of justice and impartiality, is moral practices about caring vulnerable others and sustaining intimate relationships. Despite the well-acknowledged contrast between care ethics and morality of justice, ethicists such as Darwall (2002) and Slote (2007), both are under the great influence of care ethics, have attempted to incorporate the two by reducing care ethics into impartial moral system. In response, Held (2006) defends care ethics as an alternative normative moral theory irreducible to morality of justice, virtue ethics as well. In addition, Held (2006) proposes to take care as valuable to any relation in general, social relation in particular, so that caring practices can be evaluated and bad ones should be reformed. Despite her great efforts at elaborating the moral significance of valuing care, Held's top-down approach, which takes care as value to be the guidance of caring practice, obscures the dynamical relations between them. Instead, I offer an account of care ethics as a normative moral theory, which is developed through filling in the two-way relation between care as value and the practice of care. The value of care has been illuminated within, not without, the practices of care for centuries; in turn, caring practices should be guided by taking seriously the value of care for the prevention of abuses. Last but not the least, I elaborate, following Held (2006), that care as value should be grasped in both moral and political spheres. To that purpose, I argue that care ethics as a comprehensive moral and political doctrine can be much improved by the works of Kolodny, Darwall and Slote with regard to their conceptions of care. As a result, the working out of the value of care to its substantial contents would demonstrate that care ethics could subsume the values of justice and equality most favored by main (male) stream morality.