The Translucent Face

透明的臉

賴仕維(Simon van Rysewyk)

《人文社會學報》 9期 (2008/07) Pp. 67-84

摘要

「辨識哲學」中的主流模式抱持如下觀點：辨識人的臉孔時，牽涉一個心靈詮釋的過程。這個模式是這樣的：若我在當下的視覺印象符合先前在我心靈中所儲存的印象時，我就能辨識你的臉孔;就像是閱讀刻在蠟板上的字一般，只要蠟板上的字還在，就能夠存取過去的記錄。在哲學與日常經驗中，這個模式廣泛地為人所接受，但是在不為人知的情況中，這個模式受到廣泛接受的事實，反而遮掩了許多反對這個模式，但存在於辨識過程中的諸多特徵。在本文中，我們將透過與另一種模式共置的方式，重新呈現那些在辨識過程中存在但尚未受承認的概念;這也就是那種從維根斯坦哲學以及他針對辨識與視覺記憶的說明裡所推衍出來的模式(Wittgenstein,1958, 1974)。在這個作為另一種選擇的模式中，人的臉孔是透明的。維根斯坦說，看到某張臉孔的理由，不是因為反省到什麼印象的理由，而是因為這張臉本身的理由(Wittgenste in， 1980, §170) 。我們將以辨識熟悉的臉孔作為「透明臉孔模式」的典範例證。我們同時也檢視這個模式中所涵蓋的幾點批判意涵。首先，辨識你的臉孔並不需要在我的腦海中涉及你的臉孔或表情的任何印象。其次，將一個腦海中的印象與照片作比較的想法，是錯誤的。最後，即使在我腦海中，你的臉孔所出現的印象的確因伴隨你的臉孔或表情而生，這依然不能解釋什麼，因為那樣我總需要反過來先能夠辨識說，這個印象就是那張臉孔表情的印象。

關鍵字

人的面孔 ； 臉部辨識 ； 視覺記憶 ； 維根斯坦

並列摘要

The dominant model in philosophies of recognition holds that human facial recognition involves a process of mental interpretation. The idea is that I recognize your face or expression when the current visual impression coincides with my previously stored mental one, like reading off writing on wax tablets: as long as the wax imprint remains, the record of the past can be retrieved. Although this model is widely accepted in philosophy and much human experience, it unconsciously screens out various features of recognition that speak against it. In this paper, we draw out the unacknowledged acceptance of this conception by juxtaposing it with a different model; one derived from the philosopher Wittgenstein and his remarks on recognition and visual memory (Wittgenstein, 1958, 1974). In this alternative model, the human face is translucent. One sees the human face, Wittgenstein says, not “in reflected light but rather in its own＂ (Wittgenstein, 1980, §170). We consider the recognition of familiar faces as paradigmatic of the model of the translucent face. We also review the critical insights this model embodies. Firstly, facial recognition need not involve a mental image in my mind of your face or expression. Secondly, comparing a mental image with a picture is misconceived. Finally, even if a mental image of a face in my mind does accompany recognizing your face or expression, it cannot explain it, since I would in turn have to recognize that the image is an image of the facial expression.

並列關鍵字

human face ； facial recognition ； visual memory ； Wittgenstein

參考文獻

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