選制差異影響選舉課責的探索研究：以立法委員選舉為例

An Exploratory Study of Electoral Accountability under Different Legislative Electoral Systems

游清鑫(Ching-Hsin Yu) ； 范惕維(Ti-Wei Fan)

《民主與治理》 1卷1期 (2014/02) Pp. 111-141

https://doi.org/10.3966/2311505X2014020101005

摘要

政治課責是代議民主運作的重要基石之一。政治課責的實踐有助於政治領袖與民主政府的回應性，對於經常受到政治領袖在贏得選舉後濫權的新興民主國家來講，政治課責更顯得重要，在臺灣邁向民主鞏固的階段，政治課責也成為評估臺灣民主品質的重要參考。現階段臺灣有關政治課責的研究文獻多數集中討論選民對政府的表現評估與投票決定之間的關聯性，至於選舉制度如何影響選民的課責行為則相對上較少關切。本研究乃針對臺灣選民在2001 ～ 2012 年立委選舉中選舉課責的探索性研究，並藉由立委選制在2008 年由原來的單記不可讓渡投票制改革成單一選區兩票制的混合式選舉制度的經驗，比較不同立委選制之下，選民進行選舉課責的狀況。本研究發現，在過去四次的立委選舉當中，選民的確存在選舉課責的行為，但由於單記不可讓渡投票制強調候選人個人選票的特性，使得選民在選舉中進行選舉課責的情形要比在單一選區兩票制的課責來得模糊；同時，在同樣是單一選區兩票制之下，全國比例代表制的選舉課責也要比單一選區相對多數決制的課責來得更為明顯。在結論部分，除了呈現研究成果外，本研究重申課責研究的重要性，並對未來的研究改進提出一些建議。

關鍵字

比例代表制 ； 單一選區兩票制 ； 單一選區相對多數決 ； 單記不可讓渡投票制 ； 選舉課責

並列摘要

Political accountability is one of the bedrocks for a functioning representative democracy. The realization of political accountability would contribute to the appearance of responsive political leaders as well as responsive government. It is especially important for young democracies where political leaders abuse the mandate of the electorate after elections. As Taiwan enters into the phase of democratic consolidation, political accountability has turned into a crucial yardstick to ensure qualified governance. Existing literature of political accountability in Taiwan have paid more attention to the associations between voter's assessments of government performance and intention of voting. By contrast, the relationship between electoral systems and accountability is relatively less concerned. This paper is an exploratory study of voter's electoral accountability in legislative elections from 2001 to 2012. The Legislative electoral system in Taiwan had changed from single nontransferable vote (SNTV) to mixed-member majoritarian system (MMM) in 2008. This electoral system reform has provided valuable opportunity to examine how different electoral systems affect voter's electoral accountability. It finds electoral accountability has existed since 2001 under SNTV and has continued to 2008 when MMM has implemented. Yet, given the popularity of personal vote attributes, electoral accountability under SNTV is less prominent than that of under MMM. Moreover, the results also show proportional representation (PR) system under MMM is more likely to provide voter with clear mechanism of electoral accountability than single member district (SMD) system under MMM. In conclusion, except for the findings, this paper reiterates the importance of studying accountability and suggests some improvements in the future.

並列關鍵字

proportional representation ； mixed-member majoritarian system ； single member district ； single nontransferable vote ； electoral accountability