在戴震各期著作中,皆有論述《中庸》之道的思想文字,且各有異同:《中庸補注》重視心知以修道,使心知得以清明,再透過問學使人道等同天道,一之於善。《原善》則兼重心知及人欲之修養,達到不私之仁及不蔽之智的境界,使自然情欲得以發展為必然之道。《孟子字義疏證》則延續《原善》已初步提到之傾向,並更強調人性自身已有喜愛道德的傾向,實是心知的自然本能,故心知便是人欲得以發展為仁義道德之道的根源所在,是情欲向善的關鍵。人僅需擴充、增加心知之智,便能達情遂欲,臻於至道。也因此學者不須依賴事物之上的道體,戴震以此反對理學以理為道的思想。和《原善》和《中庸補注》二書相較,《孟子字義疏證》論《中庸》之道既延續戴震一貫重智之思想,並進一步明確提出反理學之道論及工夫論,確為戴震思想之晚年定論無疑。
There are differences to expound Way of The Doctrine of the Mean in Dai Zhen's philosophical books. In Supplementary Notes of Mean, he had valued the thinking ability of the heart, in which had made Way in human become goodness. In Investigate into What Is Good, Dai Zhen had both emphasized the work in thinking the ability of heart and lusts, so people should use their mind to direct lust into the inevitable virtue. In The Annotation in Mencius' Words, Dai Zhen had continued the work in Investigate into What Is Good, and had detailed emphasized people could expand the wisdom to adjust lust into the virtue. Dai Zhen had also clearly proposed his theory to oppose Neo-Confucianism, such as against Principle is the essence of Way. He had established further and complete system in The Annotation in Mencius' Words.