賽局理論於東港櫻花蝦漁業資源共管之應用

受台灣東港櫻花蝦共同管理組織成功案例之啟發，本研究利用一具有懲罰不合作者機制的共有資源賽局實驗，分析參與者在資訊不完整情形下之合作行為，主要變數為漁業資源監控的潛在錯誤。參與者共分為四組，賽局進行方式採志願投資機制 (voluntary contribution mechanism, VCM)，參與者可自由分配初始資金至私人投資或是共同經營投資，同組參與者可看到其他組員於共同經營部分的投資量，並可將初始資金用於懲罰不合作者。為凸顯監控錯誤之可能性，遊戲過程中顯示同組組員於共同經營部分的投資量存在誤差，誤差共有三種版本，分別服從標準差0、0.5、1 的常態分配。實驗結果顯示參與者互相懲罰的頻率及額度隨監控誤差增加而提升，但懲罰效果卻下降。在標準差為 0.5 的版本下參與者懲罰的頻率及額度顯著較高，同時也因投入在共同經營部分額度小，反而有高單位報酬。懲罰系統在實驗中扮演重要角色但可能不適合應用於本研究的志願投資機制。

關鍵字

共有資源；賽局理論；共同管理；不確定性；志願投資機制； Z-Tree ；電子監控

並列摘要

An experimental, common-pool resource game with a decentralized sanctioning mechanism was tested to analyze the effects of imperfect information on co-management cooperation. A co-management organization of Sakura Shrimp fishermen in Donggang, Taiwan, served as inspiration for this experiment. Potential errors in fisheries monitoring technologies were the key experimental variable. The game followed the design of a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) with a private market and a common-pool resource market dependent on the collective contributions of all players in groups of four. Players observed the contributions of others within their group and were given the opportunity to punish non-cooperators. Subjects participated in one of three versions of the game, each varying the accuracy of the contribution signal displayed. Errors in the signal were normally distributed from the actual contribution value with standard deviations of 0, 0.5, and 1. Player punishments increased in both frequency and severity with increases in signal noise. However, the effect of punishment also decreased with increasing noise. Players in the treatment with standard deviation equal to 0.5 significantly punished more often and more severely. And yet also contributed significantly less to the common-pool resource and thus experienced consistently higher yields and efficiency. Anti-social punishment played a major role in all treatments and may not be appropriate for a voluntary contribution mechanism of this design.