董事薪酬決議機制之再建構

董事薪酬的相關議題，隨著近年來社會財富不均、貧富差距擴大等浪潮的席捲，屢屢成為社會大眾、公司治理研究學者與實務工作者的關注焦點。在這樣的浪潮下，薪資報酬委員會等外國制度的引進成為因應的方法之一，然而著重於新規範的設計卻忽略了與現行制度產生齟齬的可能性，公司法第196條第1項規定的不動如山，更凸顯改革浪潮下是否仍應恪守股東會中心法制設計的疑義以及潛在的矛盾與不合理。本文旨在重新建構董事薪酬決議的機制，以真實反映實務運行現況與維護法規一體性，而法規上應如何妥善調整、是否有必要再行引進外國制度等，諸多疑義均有待釐清。為解決上述問題，本文先行分析報酬與酬勞定性的爭辯、統整我國現行董事薪酬決議規範之改革必要性所在，以完善建構後續討論基礎，接著將討論重心置於英國法Comply-or-Explain（遵循或解釋）原則以及外國法Say-on-Pay（薪酬發言權）制度援引可行性之探討，輔以薪資報酬委員會爭議解決與功能的強化，以及薪酬資訊揭露義務的再強化與再透明化，確立短期階段藉由Comply-or-Explain原則的援引與軟性規範的修正，以衡平實務運作與法律規範產生脫節的現況、中期階段大幅修正公司法第196條第1項規定，改採為董事會中心的立法設計、後期階段在前階段均順利完成的前提下，再行引進Say-on-Pay制度，賦予股東表達意見的機會以及有效箝制董事薪酬浮濫的管道等立法修正方向。本文期望藉由分析現行公司法等相關規範與實務之運作現況，檢討其不備之處，並嘗試提出妥善之立法建議，期能完備董事薪酬決議機制的建構。

關鍵字

董事薪酬；董事薪酬決議機制； Comply-or-Explain ； Say-on-Pay ；薪酬委員會；薪酬資訊揭露

並列摘要

Issues concerning directors’ remuneration has caught the eyes of the society, scholars who do research on corporate governance, and practitioners under the tide of economic inequality and the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Under such circumstances, the introduction of foreign regulations, such as the formation of Compensation Committees, acts as one of the relieving methods. However, the emphasis on introducing new regulations neglects the potential conflicts between the newly-introduced norms and current regulations. Moreover, the lack of flexibility regarding Article 196 paragraph 1 of Company Act highlights doubts and potential contradictions of whether the basis of shareholders primacy should still be adhered to under the revolution. The purpose of the thesis is to reconstruct the mechanism that determines directors' remuneration, in order to truly reflect the current situation of legal practice and maintain the integrity of corporate regulations. Nonetheless, many doubts have been cast on how to properly reform the current regulations or whether there is a necessity to introduce other foreign regulations. In order to bring up a solution, the thesis first forms the basis for the following discussion by analyzing the debate of different forms of directors’ remuneration and summarizing the necessity of reforming the current mechanism in Taiwan. Then the thesis focuses on the feasibility of invoking the principle of “Comply-or-Explain” under English law and the system of “Say-on-Pay” from foreign regulations, accompanied by both the resolving of dispute surrounding Compensation Committee and the seek for enforcing its function, as well as the strengthening and re-transparency of the obligation to the disclosure of remuneration information. In conclusion, the thesis provides appropriate legislative suggestions for short-term, mid-term and long-term individually. For the short-term stage, in order to balance the current situation that there is an obvious disconnection between practical operation and legal norms, the thesis suggests that the principle of “Comply-or-Explain” should be invoked and soft-law concerning corporate governance should be revised. As for the mid-term stage, Article 196 of Company Act should be greatly amended to adopt the spirit of director primacy. On the premise that the former stages were successfully completed, the system of “Say-on-Pay” should be introduced to provide shareholders with the opportunity to express opinions and to effectively suppress excessive remuneration of company directors. Through the analysis of current regulations and practical experiences, reviewing their deficiencies, and proposing appropriate legislative suggestions, the thesis aims to reconstruct company directors’ remuneration determination mechanism.

並列關鍵字

Directors’ remuneration ； Directors’ remuneration determination mechanism ； Comply-or-Explain ； Say-on-Pay ； Compensation Committee ； Directors’ remuneration disclosure