有鑑於超額薪酬在金融海嘯發生後,受到社會關注並備受爭議,我國法規進而於2011年底規定所有上市櫃公司強制設立薪酬委員會。本研究以分年比較之方式,探討薪酬委員會設置後,高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之連結程度是否增加,並研究設置薪酬委員會後,是否藉由高階經理人薪酬與當期績效之配適而提升公司未來營運績效,且進一步了解其過高薪酬與過低薪酬對次期績效的影響。 本研究結果顯示:設置薪酬委員會後,高階經理人之薪酬─績效連結程度並無提升,甚至降低;並且與同產業樣本平均下之不合理薪酬(包含過高薪酬與過低薪酬)對次期績效之影響反而為正向。本研究認為,或許係因設置薪酬委員會後,所有樣本平均下之薪酬並非與績效最佳配適之結果,致使較高薪酬與較低薪酬對次期績效為正向影響,亦即,無法藉由薪酬與績效之結合而達到連結股東利益與代理人決策之效果。
Excess compensation has recently attracted considerable attention after the financial crisis. As a result, Taiwan’s legislature requires companies whose shares are listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange or traded over the counter to have compensation committees. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the alignment between CEO compensation and performance measures is greater after the mandatory adoption of compensation committees, and to examine whether firm performance is superior when CEO compensation is more aligned with performance measures when the compensation committees are adopted subsequently in 2011. The empirical results show that (1) the alignment between CEO compensation and performance measures is worse after the adoption of compensation committees, and (2) the effect of abnormal compensation (i.e. CEO overpayment and underpayment) in the industries towards firm performance of subsequent periods is positive. The findings also suggest that the average alignment between CEO compensation and performance measurement after the adoption of compensation committees may not be optimal in the industries.