通路商的合作與妥協－ 以大聯大公司的談判模式為例

Coorperation and Compromise of Distributors: A Case Study on Negotiation Model of WPG Holdings Limited

胡正陽(Cheng-Yang Hu)

指導教授 ： 江炯聰

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學組/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.00883

摘要

通路商的功能是提供上游供應商與下游消費者的橋樑，但國內的通路商價值直到這幾年才被重視，而且也只注意到B to C 的通路上，如7-11、聯強等，而對於B to B 的通路一直以來都存在著其附加價值何在的問號，尤其是上下游的資訊透明時，大聯大公司就是處於這樣的環境中，所以就產生了被要求高但毛利低，投入多但收穫少的情況。在這樣的情況下，除了不斷彰顯自己的附加價值外，還要不斷與上下游或同行的互動，此互動包含了賽局的設計及運用與佐於談判。
本研究主要發現如下：1、通路商不管是與上下游間的賽局或談判，都還會有下一輪的情況出現，所以雙方常會接受妥協，尤其是通路商，因長久以來甚少從商業模式中發現自己的價值，因此常無法堅持立場，最後就變成依賴對方態度勝過於談判過程中的努力。但實際上良好的準備，不只能在談判上取得有利位置，也能表明自身立場彰顯價值。因此先確定本身價值，對能否得到談判對手的認同及賽局的設計是相當重要的，這點是一般通路商最欠缺的。大聯大控股雖是國內最大通路商也不免如此，更遑論其他通路商一定也會面對這個問題，這是通路商在談判過程中最根本的問題，也是與上下游間談判的最大障礙。2、在談判或賽局的實務中，雙方都知道這是連續賽局的一部分，雖然也常出現單方較為強勢，壓迫另一方接受其非理性的態度及方法外，但總不會往玉石俱焚的方向進行，也就是在談判中總會有人妥協（通常是較弱勢者），在此之中大多是通路商威脅或採行邊緣政策時能得到較佳的效果，由此可知，其實談判的參與者是可以互相要求在合理或理性的情境下進行賽局及談判，這才能使雙方的溝通達到共識。

關鍵字

賽局理論 ； 談判 ； 通路產業

並列摘要

Distributors is provide the bridge of upstream suppliers and downstream consumers, but the value of the distributors has been note until recent years, but only noted the channel B to C, such as 7-11, Synnex, etc. The added value of B to B has been a question, especially with transparency of information between upstream and downstream. WPG is in such an environment, so we in to a situation that be asked a lot but low-margin, high-input but not gain. In such circumstances, the distributors should demonstrate their value, but also constantly interaction with the upstream, downstream and peer, this interaction includes the use of game design and negotiation.
This research found:（1）The game between distributors and upstream or downstream always have the next round, so the both side of the game often accept a compromise, in particular the distributor side, as has long been rarely found value in their business model. Therefore, distributors often can not insist their position, and become dependent on the rivals’ attitude but not the efforts during the negotiation process. However, a good preparation could not only achieve a favorable position in the negotiations, but also demonstrate their value. To determine the company’s value is important to whether to get identify and game design. This is the most lacking in the distributor industry. WPG Holdings is the largest distributor in Taiwan, though could not help that, not to mention other distributors must also face this problem. This is the fundamental issue during the process of negotiations, but also the biggest obstacles of negotiation between distributors and upstream or downstream.（2）In this case, both side of the negotiations are aware that it is a part of continual match. Although, it often happens one side of the game is stronger, and oppresses another side to accept its non-rational manner and the method. But will mot always carry of toward the direction of both-lose, that is, someone compromises in the negotiation (usually is the weaker side). Mostly, the distributors threat or will pick the brinkmanship can obtain better effect, thus it may be known, the participant of negotiation may request mutually to paly game theory and negotiate under reasonable or the rational situation, this the only way to achieve common sense from communication.

並列關鍵字

Game Theory ； Negotiation ； Distribution Industry

參考文獻

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