本研究旨在探討績效獎酬制度中的財務與非財務指標對盈餘管理的影響。近年來,大部分公司均設有獎酬制度,目的是為引導經理人站在公司的立場,以極大化公司利潤為目標,同時也促使經理人自身能獲得相對應的或有薪酬,文中分別以應計法及實質法兩種方法衡量盈餘管理。研究結果顯示,不論是哪一種方法,財務指標與盈餘管理均呈現顯著正相關,其原因可能為財務指標與盈餘有直接關聯,經理人在面對財務指標時,可能操縱報導盈餘,使其調整至或有薪酬規定之標準,以取得該筆薪酬。另一方面,研究結果亦顯示,非財務指標與盈餘管理呈現顯著負相關,究其原因可能為非財務指標較財務指標考量得長遠,經理人較無法利用短期的盈餘管理達到其目的,因此可促使經理人從事盈餘管理的可能性變小。
We find evidence that types of performance measures in the compensation contracts are significantly related to the earnings management. The proxies of earnings management we use include measures for accrual earnings management and real activities earnings management. The results show that the financial performance measures are significantly positively related to both accrual and real activities earnings management, the reason of these results may be that the financial performance measures are directly related to the reported earnings. On the other hand, the results show that the nonfinancial performance measures are significantly negatively related to both accrual and real activities earnings management, suggesting that the nonfinancial performance measures may motivate managers to manipulate earnings downward, because the nonfinancial performance measures are the long-run perspectives and manage short-run earnings cannot effectively improve the nonfinancial performance measures. Based on the findings, we suggest that using nonfinancial performance measures may reduce opportunism of the earnings management.