公司治理、績效薪資 與 分析師報導：對盈餘管理的影響

本文主要研究在控制公司治理與績效薪資之下，分析師報導是否對於公司管理階層仍有額外的監督效果。本篇樣本包含標準普爾1500之組成，樣本期間為2001至2006年。為了更精確的衡量盈餘管理，本文使用延伸修正後Jones模型來估計裁量性應計項目。實證結果顯示，當考慮公司治理與績效薪資對盈餘管理的影響之下，分析師報導對於公司管理階層有額外的監督效果，可有效使公司管理當局減少對盈餘的操弄。

關鍵字

公司治理；績效薪資；分析師報導；盈餘管理

並列摘要

This study examines whether, after controlling the influence of corporate governance and pay-for-performance on earnings management, analyst coverage still have extra effect to monitor the executives in companies and to reduce the problem of the earnings management or not. The sample in this research is the component of Standard & Poor 1500 and the sample period is during 2001-2006. To do more accurate measure of earnings management, I use the extended modified Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals. The empirical result suggests that analyst coverage have extra influence of monitor on the executives in companies to reduce earnings management after controlling the effect of corporate governance and pay-for-performance on earnings management.

並列關鍵字

Corporate governance ； Pay-for-performance ； Analyst coverage ； Earnings management

參考文獻

Baker, T., D. Collins, and A. Reitenga, 2003. Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incentives. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Financing 18, 557-582.

Bartov, E., D. Givoly, and C. Hayn, 2002. The Rewards to Meeting or Beating Earnings Expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33, 173–204.

Bartov, E, P Mohanram, 2004. Private Information, Earnings Manipulations, and Executive Stock-Option Exercises. The Accounting Review 79, 889-920.

Bergstresser, D., T. Philippon, 2006. CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics 80, 511–529.

Bradshaw, M.T., S.A Richardson, and Sloan, R.G Sloan, 2006. The Relation between Corporate Financing Activities, Analysts’ Forecasts and Stock Returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42, 53–85

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公司治理、績效薪資與分析師報導：對盈餘管理的影響

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