過度自信、薪酬水準與投資決策：以高階經理人更換後再謀職為例

What happens to CEOs after they turnover? Overconfidence, compensation and investment decision

陳柏蓉(Po-Jung Chen)

指導教授 ： 陳聖賢

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/博士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.10513

摘要

本篇以高階經理人更換後再謀職為例，高階經理人若為適度過度自信且自願離職、較年輕、過去績效佳、從大公司離職，較容易在離職後再被其他公司聘為高階經理人。公司具有較好的成長機會和較多的研究發展費用支出，較有可能聘用過度自信的高階經理人。過度自信的高階經理人要求較高的薪資，並且當公司面臨成長機會時會增加公司的投資支出。

關鍵字

過度自信 ； 行為財務學 ； 高階經理人 ； 薪酬 ； 投資決策

並列摘要

What happens to CEOs after they turnover? We examine CEOs who can be hired as CEO by another firm after turnover. CEOs with moderately-optimism, who voluntary left from departing firm, younger, better prior performance and from big departing firm are more likely to be hired as CEO by another firm after turnover. Firms with higher growth opportunity and R&D expenditures are willing to hire overconfident CEOs. More optimistic CEOs can receive higher total compensation than less optimistic CEOs. Finally, Overconfident CEOs will increase firm investment while firm with high growth opportunity.

並列關鍵字

Overconfidence ； Behavior Finance ； Chief Executive Officer ； Compensation ； Investment Decision

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