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薪酬揭露方式會影響總經理替換率與績效敏感度嗎?

Does the Way of Compensation Disclosure Really Affect the CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity?

摘要


本研究探討主管機關修正高階主管薪酬應依「個別揭露」改為依「總額揭露」後,其對總經理替換率與績效敏感度之影響。實證結果發現,薪酬揭露方式修訂後,總經理替換率與績效敏感度會較修正公告前小。此外,本研究亦探討家族企業之總經理替換率與績效敏感度在薪酬揭露方式修訂前後之影響。實證結果發現,相較於非家族企業,家族企業在薪酬揭露方式修訂後,其總經理替換率與績效敏感度下降幅度較非家族企業小。

並列摘要


This study investigates after changing the way of compensation disclosure from single compensation disclosure to total compensation disclosure that how to affect CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. The results show that after adopting total compensation disclosure, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity will be smaller than before. In addition, we also investigate that after adopting total compensation disclosure, how to affect the family ownership on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. The results indicate that compared to non-family firms, the decrease of CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for family firms.

參考文獻


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