CEO特質對於企業財務政策之影響

The Effect of CEO Characteristics on Corporate Financial Policies

簡偌鍇(Nuo-Kai Chien)

指導教授 ： 何耕宇

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201701602

摘要

基於Hambrick and Mason (1984)提出的高層理論(Upper-Echelons Theory)，公司各種策略的執行被認為是決策者特質的一種表徵。自此，各項後續相關研究蓬勃發展，期望能找出管理階層各類特質對於企業策略執行的相關性。本研究主要目的即在於探討CEO財務背景經驗及其年資與企業財務政策的關連性。本文以我國除金融業外之上市上櫃公司為主要研究對象，蒐集整理2011至2015年企業CEO特質與公司營運狀況資料進行實證分析，並以資本結構政策、股利政策與股票購回政策作為公司財務政策指標。研究發現具有財務背景的CEO對於各項財務政策指標之影響皆不顯著，顯示國內企業CEO之財務背景影響力並不如預期。CEO年資則與長期負債比率顯著負相關，亦與發放現金股利顯著正相關，符合年資較長CEO較為風險趨避，並傾向於少做投資多回饋股東之假設。

關鍵字

CEO特質 ； 財務專長 ； 年資 ； 財務政策 ； 風險偏好

並列摘要

Based on the Upper-Echelons Theory in Hambrick and Mason (1984), a firm’s strategy has been thought to be a reflection of the decision maker’s characteristic. Since then, numerous related studies are conducted, expecting to find out the correlation between managerial traits and firm strategy. The main purpose of this research is to explore the relation between CEO characteristics and corporate financial policies. We use CEO’s financial expertise and tenure as proxies of CEO characteristics and long-term-debt ratio, cash dividend payout and share buyback as proxies of financial policies. The study is based on firm level data and CEO personal data of non-financial firms in Taiwan from 2011-2015. The empirical results show that CEO’s financial expertise is not as influential as we think. However, CEO’s tenure does matter; the coefficient is significantly negative for long-term-debt ratio and significantly positive for cash dividend payout, which are in line with our expectation. The evidence suggest that CEO with longer tenure might be more risk-aversion and tend to do less investment but pay more back to the shareholders instead.

並列關鍵字

CEO characteristics ； Financial expertise ； Tenure ； Financial policy ； Risk preference

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