少數股東召集股東會之研究

A Study on Calling of Shareholders' Meetings by Minority Shareholders

許名志(Ming-Chih Hsu)

指導教授 ： 王泰銓

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.10378

摘要

股東會作為股東表達意見及商議之場所，股東有出席股東會選任或解任董事，以及對公司之經營方向予以表決之權利。更重要的是，股東得在股東會中監督董事會之行為以作為公司監控之重要機制之一。

惟現今公司實務上，大股東往往藉由多數決之方式當選為董事，控制股東會，且董事會經常對與其利益相反之會議事項拒絕召集股東會。更有甚者，因監察人與董事為同一群大股東所選出，通常亦不主動召集股東會監督董事，致侵害少數股東之股東權益。因此，有必要保障少數股東之股東會召集權。我國公司法第173條雖賦予少數股東於董事會不為召集或不能召集股東會時，得自行召集股東會，惟本條要件仍有缺失，致無法有效確保少數股東之權利。

本論文以少數股東權之保障及鼓勵少數股東積極監控公司經營者為中心，研究公司法少數股東召集股東會之規範。據此，本論文之研究架構如下：於第一章介紹研究動機、研究目的、研究方法與範圍。其次，於第二章說明股東會與股東權益之關係，以此開展出保障少數股東之股東會召集權及強化少數股東作為公司之監控機制。並且，探究我國公司法第173條之要件，以及分析學說與實務之相關爭議問題。第三章觀察外國少數股東召集股東會之規範及實務案例，包含日本、中國、英國，以及美國數州，於第四章經由法律之比較分析，比較我國與外國少數股東召集股東會之規範，並檢討我國公司法之缺失。第五章提出本論文之研究發現及公司法第173條未來修法方向之建議。

關鍵字

少數股東 ； 少數股東權 ； 股東會 ； 股東臨時會 ； 召集股東會

並列摘要

Shareholders’ meetings are forums for shareholders to express opinions and engage in deliberations. Shareholders have their rights to attend meetings, elect suitable persons to be directors, remove directors, and vote for how the company to be run in shareholders’ meetings. What is more important, shareholders are as a vital part of mechanism of corporate governance to supervise boards of directors in shareholders’ meetings.

As a matter of fact, majority shareholders are also directors by means of majority vote. Boards of directors often refuse to call shareholders’ meetings as subjects opposing their self-interest. Furthermore, on account of the reason that supervisors and directors are elected by the same group of majority shareholders, supervisors are unwilling to call shareholders’ meetings to supervise boards of directors. Consequently, minority shareholders’ rights are violated by majority shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to protect minority shareholders’ rights to call shareholders’ meetings.

The provision 173 of Corporation Law grants minority shareholders statutory rights to call shareholders’ meetings on their own when boards of directors fail or can not call shareholders’ meetings. Nevertheless, the existing elements of this provision are still deficient so that it doesn’t ensure minority shareholders’ rights effectively.

This thesis focuses on protecting minority shareholders’ rights and encouraging them to monitor management of corporation actively, researching the norm about calling of shareholders’ meetings by minority shareholders on Corporation Law. Accordingly, the
structure of this thesis consists five chapters as follows:
Chapter 1 of this thesis, it introduces the motivation, purposes, methods, and scope of this thesis. Chapter 2 of this thesis, it illustrates the relationship between shareholders’ meetings and shareholders’ rights, developing protections of minority shareholders’ rights for calling shareholders’ meetings and strengthening minority shareholders as mechanism of corporate governance. Moreover, it discusses the elements of the provision 173 of our Corporation Law, and analyzes relative issues of judgments and academic perspectives about calling shareholders’ meetings by minority shareholders. Chapter 3 of this thesis, it observes foreign corporation laws about norms and judgments of calling shareholders’ meetings by minority shareholders, including Japan, China, United Kingdom and U.S. states. Chapter 4 of this thesis, through the analysis of comparative laws, it compares theories and practices of our Corporation Law with foreign corporation laws, then criticizing deficiencies about the provision 173 of our Corporation Law. Chapter 5 of this thesis, it concludes the findings of the preceding chapters, proposing the recommendations on our Corporation Law amendment in the future.

並列關鍵字

Minority Shareholders ； Special Meetings

參考文獻

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