歐洲聯盟競爭法垂直交易限制規範對我國公平交易法之啟示

垂直交易限制(Vertical Restraints)，是指非屬同一產銷階段的上下游事業合意限制彼此間的競爭，雖然可能造成限制競爭的效果，但是整體而言，其帶來的正面影響，有可能超過其造成的負面影響，因此並非所有的垂直交易限制均必然違法，而有例外合法的可能性。歐盟競爭法針對垂直交易限制，係採取「團體除外制度（block exemptions）」，預先公布具體要求條件，倘事業達成的協議符合相關條件，則不必申報批准而得直接實施，即所謂「團體除外規則」。現行的團體除外規則為第330/2010號規則(Commission Regulation No.330/2010)，列舉數個核心限制（hard-core restrictions），及不得除外的限制（non-exempted restrictions），並以市占率30%作為違法門檻。我國公平交易法就垂直交易限制得否例外合法，僅概括規定主管機關就事業所提事證應審酌之因素。就違法門檻之規定，區分為垂直價格限制與垂直非價格限制而有所不同，前者只要認定事業有限制轉售價格的行為，即認定其行為違法，行為事業的市占率多寡在所不問；後者就違法門檻未明定統一的衡量標準，僅依賴我國法院判決實務認定，以市占率10%作為違法門檻。就垂直交易限制之例外規定，倘無明確規範可資遵循，事業無法判斷該垂直性交易限制有無違法的可能，殊難進行長期的經營規劃。再者，市占率既作為違法性判斷之前提要件，倘事業不能由法律條文中知悉，如何期待其能自主遵循？此外，歐盟的市場規模大，尚以市占率30%作為違法門檻，我國的市場規模小，竟以市占率10%作為違法門檻，事業恐有動輒得咎之虞，實不利我國經濟發展。綜上所述，本文建議，我國可參考歐盟的作法，歸納實務案例，將其類型化、具體化，制定類似團體除外規則之行政規則，以利事業遵循，而就垂直非價格限制之違法門檻，應明文規定較現行實務更高的市占率門檻，以創造公平且理想的競爭環境。

關鍵字

歐盟競爭法；公平交易法；垂直交易限制；垂直性聯合行為；團體除外規則

並列摘要

Vertical restraints refer to the agreement on competition restriction between upstream and downstream firms belonging to different production and marketing levels. Though the effects of restrictive competition might follow as a result, overall, the positive impact these restraints bring is larger than its negative influence. Therefore, not all Vertical restraints are definitely illegal since there might be possible legal exceptions. EU Competition Law adopts the Block Exemption Regulation regarding Vertical restraints: the concrete demands are announced ahead, and if the agreement between firms meets the relevant regulations, no submission for approval is needed for the agreement to be directly put into practice. The current Block Exemption Regulation is Commission Regulation No.330/2010 in which several hardcore restrictions and non-exempted restrictions are listed. The threshold of violating the competition law is 30% of market share. To determine whether Vertical restraints can be exceptionally legal, the Fair Trade Act of Taiwan only requires competent authorities to review the evidence provided by the firms. Meanwhile, the threshold for violating the law differs between vertical price restraints and non-price vertical restraints; the former deems the act of restricting resale prices to be illegal regardless of the size of the firms’ market share, while the latter has no unified standards for the threshold but relies upon actual court decisions in Taiwan, that is, 10% of market share. There are no specific regulations to comply with regarding the exceptions of Vertical restraints. Firms cannot determine if certain Vertical restraints are illegal, resulting in difficulties in putting forward a long-term business plan. Further, since market share cannot be used to determine legality, how does one expect firms to follow the regulations of Vertical restraints on their own if the regulations are nowhere to be found in the law? Moreover, the EU has a large-scale market and still uses 30% of market share as the threshold, whereas Taiwan, having a small-scale market, uses 10% of market share as the threshold, leading to firms being reproachable at every turn and detrimental effects on the economical development of Taiwan. In sum, the present study suggests that Taiwan can refer to the EU and conclude, categorize, and actualize the practical cases in order to formulate administrative regulations similar to the Block Exemption Regulation for firms to follow. As to the threshold for violating the law of Vertical non-price restraints, there should be clear regulations of a higher market share threshold than the current one so that a fair and ideal competitive environment can be achieved.