股市流動性與經理人報復傾向對公司權力結構、長短期營運績效與經理人異動之影響

大型公司的代理問題相對於小型創業公司主要有二處不同。首先，大型公司多數的資金來自外部權益，因此存在公司內部人與外部股東的代理問題。再者，大型公司的執行長無法一手包辦所有決策問題，須由執行長將不同的決策問題交給不同部門的經理處理，因此執行長與部門經理間也存在代理問題。本文研究大型公司中的代理問題。我們進一步加入行為財務學的觀點，經理人具有報復心理，我們假設沒有獲得權力的經理人在付出努力後會產生不滿。另外，我們亦加入證券市場微結構的觀點，經理人可以進行內線交易，來探討這兩項因素對大公司的權力結構、誘因契約設計、營運績效及經理人異動造成的影響。我們考慮兩種情境，情境 C 與情境 S。在情境 C 中，經理人付出努力得到的產出為互補關係。而在情境 S 中，經理人付出努力得到的產出為替代關係。本文獲得以下幾項主要結論，首先在無股票交易的模型中: • 我們發現只有當執行長握有長期投資計劃的決定權時，經理人在第一期期末時可能遭到解雇，且經理人異動在情境 S 中較容易出現。 • 雙方利益的一致性愈高及新聘請經理人的能力愈差 (解雇的成本愈高)，執行長會傾向將權力下放，授權給經理人。 • 與 Aghion and Tirole (1997) 相比，執行長在我們的模型中有更強的誘因授權給經理人。 • 與 Hart and Moore (2008)、Hart(2009)、Hart and Holmstrom (2010) 不同，在我們的模型中公司總是能有效的利用誘因契約設計來避免遭到報復，因此不會產生無謂損失。加入股票交易後，我們發現: • 股市流動性會惡化經理人在被誘使選擇努力的契約下確實努力的誘因，另一方面，股市流動性會增強經理人在被誘使選擇不努力的契約下反而選擇努力的誘因，因此股市流動性在對公司較不利的環境 (誘使經理人選擇努力對公司而言不效率時)，能提升公司的營運績效；在對公司較有利的環境 (誘使經理人選擇努力對公司而言是效率時)，反而會降低公司的營運績效，導致公司在第零期減少提供誘使經理人努力的契約。而經理人選擇努力與否的誘因在情境 S 中受到股市流動性的影響較小。 • 股市流動性對公司權力結構的影響取決於不同類型的契約下經理人得到的報酬。 • 經理人進行股票交易會影響經理人異動的發生。一方面，股市流動性會影響公司的權力結構，當股市流動性導致經理人獲得授權時，會減少經理人異動的發生。另一方面，股市流動性夠大時，經理人有正機率為了股票交易利潤而自願遭到解雇，產生與無股票交易的情況不同的解僱原因。而在情境 S 中，因股票交易利潤導致的經理人異動較少。 • 在情境 S 中，股票市場的買賣價差較低。

關鍵字

經理人報復傾向；內線交易；權力結構；經理人異動

並列摘要

The agency problems in large corporations differ from those in entrepreneurial firmsin two main aspects. First, most investments in large firms are financed by outside equity. Thus, agency problems arise when there is a conflict of interest between corporate insiders and outside shareholders. Second, due to a large number of decision problems and their complexity in large firms, CEO cannot make all the decisions by him or herself. CEO must assign and allocate those decisions to different managers. When the incentives of CEO and managers are not aligned, agency problem arises. This thesis analyzes the agency problems in large firms. Particularly, we assume with the behavioral perspective that the manager would aggrieve if he exerts effort but the firm decides not to implement his favorite project. Also, we assume that the manager can engage in insider trading. We analyze how the interaction between managerial aggrieving and insider trading affects the firm’s authority structure, the design of the incentive contract, short-term and long-term performances, and manager turnovers. We consider two scenerarios, Case C and Case S. Where in Case C, the short-term and the long-term investments are complements. Whereas in Case S, the short-term and the long-term investments are substitutes. We have the following results. First, in the model without insider trading: • The manager would be laid off only if the CEO has the formal authority to choose the long-term investment project, and manager turnover happens more often in Case S. • The congruence of private benefit between the CEO and the manager encourages delegation. The lower the ability of the new manager also encourages delegation. • Compared to Aghion and Tirole (1997), CEO has a stronger incentive to delegate the authority to the manager in our model. • Different from Hart and Moore (2008)、Hart(2009)、Hart and Holmstrom (2010), the firm can always properly design the compensation contract to avoid shading by the aggrieving manager. Thus, no deadweight loss occurs in our model. In the model with insider trading: • Stock market liquidity will reduce the incentive of the manager to exert effort when the firm provides the manager with a high-powered incentive contract. On the other hand, stock market liquidity will enhance the incentive of the manager to exert effort when the firm provides the manager with a low-powered incentive contract. Thus, the firm would provide less high-powered incentive contracts. • The impact of stock market liquidity on the firm’s authority structure depends on the payoff the manager gets under different types of contracts. • Stock market liquidity will affect manager turnover. • The bid-ask spread of the firm’s stock is lower in Case S.

並列關鍵字

managerial aggrieving ； insider trading ； authority structure ； CEO turnover

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