中文摘要 本研究探討美國銀行業庫藏股宣告規模如何受動機與管制因素之影響。庫藏股宣告的動機有股利替代、訊號假說、抵禦併購意圖、抵銷選擇權的稀釋效果、分派現金流量。而銀行在相關法令規範及證券化的活動之下,對庫藏股宣告規模的影響也是本研究欲探討的重點。 實證結果如下: 一. 銀行所支付股利的愈多,庫藏股宣告的規模越大 二. 銀行股價被低估的程度愈大,庫藏股宣告的規模越大 三. 銀行所擁有的現金愈多、投資機會愈少,庫藏股宣告的規模越大 四. 銀行面臨被併購的威脅時,庫藏股宣告的規模越大。
This paper examines how each motivation affects the magnitude of repurchase announcement by bank holding companies in the United States. There are several motivations which may impact the magnitude of share repurchase announcement: to substitute dividends; to signal to the market that the bank’s stock is undervalued; to deter the takeover threat; to undo the dilution effect of stock options and to payout free cash flows. The banking industry is of particular interest because banks are under strict monitoring and regulation. In addition, how specific activities such as securitizations influence bank share repurchase needs further discussion. The purpose of this study is to assess how motivations and regulation affect the magnitude of repurchase announcement by bank holding companies. From the empirical result, we find that banks will announce greater stock repurchases when the dividends payout ratio is higher; when the banks are undervalued; when the banks have more cash in hand; when the investment opportunities are less and when the banks are under takeover threat.