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  • 學位論文

自我位置感的經驗研究

An Empirical Study of Self-location

指導教授 : 梁益堉

摘要


自我位置感為身體性的自我意識中 (bodily self-consciousness) 的一個重要的構件 (component),尤其是在錯覺的實驗中,常常被討論到。自我位置感一詞指的是,在主觀經驗中感覺上我相對於環境所在的位置。在本論文中,我探討了兩種理解自我位置感的方式。第一種是在主觀經驗中,我身體的位置感 (the sense of body-location):感覺上我的身體在哪裡。第二種是在主觀經驗中,我第一人稱觀點的位置感 (the sense of 1PP-location):感覺上我第一人稱觀點的位置在哪裡。本論文藉由這兩種區分討論自我位置感的意涵,及這兩者之間的關係。 在neurophilosophy lab,我們團隊藉由虛擬實境技術 (virtual-reality) 的實驗證明這兩種區分,將受試者的頭戴上頭戴式立體顯示器 (head-mounted display, HMD),受試者藉由觀看HMD裡所呈現的視覺內容,看見自己站在自己的前面。實驗設置分成三種情況:第一個是Basic condition,受試者站立不動,並從HMD 中看見自己的身體站在前面兩公尺處。第二個是Walking condition,受試者藉由HMD看見自己的身體位於視角前三十公分,並被要求從原本在鏡頭前三十公分處的位置往前移動兩公尺。第三個是Visual condition,鏡頭從原本靠近身體後方三十公分處,快速地向後移動兩公尺。實驗總共分成四個,前三個實驗分別為Basic condition的同步與不同步條件、Walking condition的同步與不同步條件Visual condition的同步與不同步條件,三個實驗採用問卷和膚電位的量測方式。在實驗一〜實驗三的結果,分別證明在Basic condition、Walking condition和Visual condition三種實驗設置中,在同步觸刷的情況下,相較於不同步觸刷,皆引發了全身的身體錯覺 (full-body illusion),受試者覺得眼前的身體是自己的。在實驗四中,我們收集了另一批受試者,比較Basic condition、Walking condition和Visual condition的設置下的同步條件比較。問卷分析顯示在這三種設置下,第一人稱觀點的位置感及身體位置感之間有顯著性差異,我們認為這代表了第一人稱觀點的位置感和身體位置感可以在主觀經驗中被區分,這兩者在主觀經驗上為不同的經驗。另外,我們還觀察到雙重身體效應 (double-body effect),此現象顯示,雖然第一人稱觀點位置感在經驗上能與身體位置感區分,但仍然是一種有身體的體現經驗 (embodied experience)。 我們的實驗結果,支持視覺經驗在自我位置感中扮演了重要角色,視覺經驗中的第一人稱觀點位置感與身體位置感,為兩種不同的主觀經驗,支持自我位置感,因此第一人稱位置感和身體位置感共同形塑了自我位置感。另外我們也回應了這兩者的區分是否會遇到二元區分的疑慮?我認為第一人稱觀點位置感和身體位置感都是體現的身體經驗 (embodied experience),因此不是二元區分 。 在全身的身體錯覺研究探討腦神經科學的部分,顳頂葉交界區是整合第一人稱觀點位置感和身體位置感的皮質區,這兩種的位置感共同形塑了自我位置感,顳頂葉交界區的活化顯示了自我位置感中,第一人稱觀點位置感和身體位置感整合的腦神經科學證據。在精神病理學部分,第一人稱觀點位置感和自我位置感在主觀經驗中是否有空間重疊整合,可以解釋autoscopic phenonmena的複雜現象。 綜合上述,本論文以經驗科學的方式研究自我位置感,自我位置感區分成第一人稱觀點位置感和身體位置感做為理論想法的初步釐清。另一方面也嘗試回應了傳統本體論的二元式區分的質疑。在腦神經科學和精神病理現象,這兩種區分得到支持。最後,為雙重位置和雙重身體效應做出可能的解釋。

並列摘要


The sense of self-location has been regarded as a key component of bodily self-consciousness, especially in the research of full-body illusions. Self-location—the sense of where I am in space—provides an experiential anchor for one’s interaction with the environment. In the studies of full-body illusions, many researchers have defined self-location solely in terms of body-location—the subjective feeling of where my body is. Although this view is useful, there is an issue regarding whether it can fully accommodate the role of 1PP-location—the sense of where my first-person perspective is located in space. In this study, I investigate self-location by comparing body-location and 1PP-location: using a head-mounted display (HMD) and a stereo camera, the subjects watched their own body standing in front of them and received tactile stimulations. In neurophilosophy lab, we manipulated their senses of body-location and 1PP-location in three different conditions: the participants standing still (Basic condition), asking them to move forward (Walking condition), and swiftly moving the stereo camera away from their body (Visual condition). In the Walking condition, the participants watched their body moving away from their 1PP. In the Visual condition, the scene seen via the HMD was systematically receding. Our data show that, under different manipulations of movement, the spatial unity between 1PP-location and body-location can be temporarily interrupted (p < 0.01). Interestingly, we also observed a “double-body effect” (p = 0.045). Our group further suggest that it is better to consider body-location and 1PP-location as interrelated but distinct factors that jointly support the sense of self-location. In addition, visual experience plays an important role in the sense of self-location. According to our results, visual experience has its locating contents including the sense of 1PP-location and the sense of body-location which contribute to shaping the sense of self-location. This idea could be also applied in explaining the higher self-location accompanied with the activation of temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) and in explaining autoscopic phenomena. Finally, I proposed bi-location is an ambiguous word, it has two meanings: double body-location and double 1PP-location, and both could be considered as ground for double-body effect.

參考文獻


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Barry, C., and Burgess, N. (2014). Neural mechanisms of self-location. Curr. Biol.

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